Newly declassified documents on the Bay of Pigs invasion reveal a monumental CIA propaganda operation that began almost a year before a CIA-trained force of exiles landed on Cuba's southern coast on April 17, 1961.

The documents speak of success in distributing propaganda inside Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America in the months leading up to the invasion. They outline plans for using seized newspapers and radio stations on the island if the invasion force was able to occupy Cuban territory. And they reveal that the CIA took direct control of radio broadcasts after becoming disillusioned with infighting among Miami exile groups that had been conducting them.

Directed by David Atlee Phillips, who also headed the CIA propaganda effort in the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz seven years earlier, the propaganda effort included leaflet drops, pre-recorded radio programs made by Cuban exiles and distributed to about 40 stations around the Caribbean, and recruitment, training and infiltration into Cuba of ``small provocateur teams.''

After all the preparations, the invasion ended in defeat in about three days of bloody fighting.

The centerpiece of the propaganda effort was Radio Swan, a medium-wave CIA station broadcasting from a tiny island in the western Caribbean that was later used as a transfer point for supplies sent to Honduran-based, U.S.-backed rebels fighting Nicaragua's Sandinista government in the 1980s. The island has since been turned over to Honduras, settling a longstanding ownership dispute.

TAYLOR REPORT

Details of the CIA propaganda operation are contained in the Taylor Report, the work of a board of inquiry formed immediately after the Bay of Pigs by President John F. Kennedy and chaired by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.

Portions of the voluminous report were declassified in May 1977 and other segments in later years, but the entire document was not declassified until last week through the efforts of the National Security Archive, a Washington-based nonprofit foreign policy center.

``This is a key document to help understand an episode that continues to reverberate in U.S.-Cuba relations,'' said Peter Kornbluh, who directs the archive's Cuba project and obtained the document's release.

Included in the Taylor Report is a six-page summary of testimony by Phillips to the Taylor Commission along with a ``Propaganda Action Plan'' formulated in support of the invasion by the U.S.-funded Brigade 2506 and a brief history of Radio Swan.

EXILE BROADCASTS

The station became operational May 17, 1960, two months after President Eisenhower approved the effort to rid Cuba of revolutionary leader Fidel Castro. It operated through a commercial front in Miami known as the Gibraltar Steamship Corp.

But Phillips, who died in 1988, said in his testimony to the Taylor Commission that the propaganda effort was much more far-reaching than Radio Swan.

Phillips said taped programs produced in Miami by Cuban exiles were air-expressed to ``about 40 stations in five countries around the Caribbean.''

``We [also] had WGBS in Miami, a very powerful medium wave station. We had a medium wave station in Key West, and we broadcast from a series of other stations from countries all around the Caribbean,'' Phillips said.

Small propaganda teams were also recruited, trained and infiltrated into Cuba, carrying printing presses, radios and other equipment.

``They successfully published a clandestine newspaper in Havana and a . . . [words deleted] carried out the only really successful political action that occurred in Havana before D-Day, which was a student strike.''

PROPAGANDA DROPS

There was, as well, a leaflet campaign with ``16 straight propaganda drops and seven more . . . combined with supply drops.''

As the invasion drew closer, Phillips said, two teams were available that were ``capable of going into Cuba to take over captured radio stations or captured newspapers. We had a radio propaganda transmitter which went in with the Brigade and we had trained the men to operate it.''

The history of Radio Swan noted that Castro began jamming it almost immediately but ``was successful only in the city of Havana.''

``Scores of letters were received from all parts of Cuba to show that the station had listeners,'' the document said. ``As late as March 1961, a survey was made to determine the extent of the listening coverage. An inexpensive ballpoint pen was offered to those listeners who would write in to the station. The reply was immediate: almost 3,000 letters from 26 countries. This barrage of mail included significant amounts from all parts of Cuba.''

STATION'S TROUBLES

But the station had its problems as well, the document noted.

``Although great numbers of Cubans still listened to the station, its credibility and reputation began to suffer as the result of statements representing the selfish interests of the Cuban groups producing the various programs.

``In the first place, these groups talked overmuch about their activities in Miami and the hard fight they were conducting along Biscayne Boulevard. Naturally, the Cubans who were suffering under the Castro dictatorship within Cuba resented this.

``Secondly, the Cuban programs became a fulcrum where the individual political ambitions of Cuban exiles in Miami were presented to the other Cubans in Miami, forgetting the all-important target audience.

``Finally, each program fought with the other for `scoops.' As time passed and the Cubans found their sources of information were no better than the next fellow's, the program producers began to exaggerate in order to give their broadcasts a touch of sensationalism. They made statements which were obvious lies to the listeners.''

Efforts to achieve the proper control failed, the document said, so on March 27, 1961, Radio Swan management sent a letter to program producers terminating their programs.

They were replaced by a programming schedule ``implacably under CIA control.''

Anti-cuban radio propaganda used as an instrument of activities and operations by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States- 1960-1980.

By: Dr. Jacinto Valdes-Dapena

U.S. propaganda against the Cuban Revolution did not begin on January 1, 1959. Even while Cuban liberal sectors were sympathetic to the struggle of the revolutionary forces against the Batista tyranny, important news media such as Life and Time magazines took the opinion that the armed insurrection movement was inspired and managed by international communism, even before 1959. It was precisely this kind of U.S. media propaganda that placed the Cuban Revolution squarely within the scenario of the Cold War... even before the Rebel Forces, the July 26th Movement, The March 13 Revolutionary Directorate and the Popular Socialist Party had taken political power.

The Revolution, whose strategy was contained in the History Will Absolve Me speech, had not yet begun to institute its first acts when the U.S. launched a veritable flood of propaganda denouncing the trials of the war criminals, cases that were legally documented, proven and sentenced according to the laws dictated by the Revolution. This war, which is still going on in a systematic and uninterrupted fashion, makes use of all propaganda methods and techniques in order to destroy the political, economic, social, legal and ethical fundamentals of the Cuban nation. Tactics vary, depending on changes in scenario; the situation determines the tactics to be used but the strategy has remained the same since 1959.

All of 1959 was marked by an intense class struggle with political, economic and ideological overtones. U.S. diplomacy, which had attempted to abort the Revolution during the last months of 1958 with a solution recalling mediation, and which literally led to the collapse of the Revolution of 1930, proposed to neutralize the Cuban Revolutionary process by using political forces of a national capitalist nature that were organically linked to powerful U.S. capital; this had been put in place to oppose the dictatorship and establish a reform government that would favour U.S. economic interests, thereby guaranteeing stability and security for the development of U.S. plans for the investment and growth of capital.

The U.S. Embassy in Havana used all contacts and support within the country in order to promote a conspiracy that would overthrow the Revolution. Among its working objectives were political figures that had made up the first Council of Ministers of the Revolution, the bourgeoisie (landowners, sugar industry, import businesses, industrial bourgeoisie not involved in the sugar industry), traditional politicians who had not participated in the dictatorship and had revealed themselves to be well disposed to collaborate in the electoral dirty business and did not agree with the use of armed conflict as a solution to the crisis that Cuban society found itself in, bur rather espoused “civic dialogue”: this was a phenomenon known as “politicking.”

All the leaders of social, economic and cultural associations making up what Marx and Engels defined as “civil society” in The German Ideology, were targets for these activities.

Certain sectors of the middle class were subject and susceptible to this type of influence; others that had actively fought against the tyranny consolidated convictions and positions within the revolutionary volcano that was Cuba at that time.

What can we say about the media: the press, the radio and the television? They certainly played an extremely important role, both as support and as an undermining agent in the revolutionary tide which was impetuously and audaciously tearing down the foundations of a hundred years of imperialist domination on the island.

One by one the enemy’s plans were smashed; the Revolutionary Government cleaned out its ranks when Fidel Castro was appointed Prime Minister in February 1959.

The revolutionary organizations July 26th Movement, March 13th Revolutionary Directorate and the Popular Socialist Party began to coordinate their activities in defence of the Revolution. The Rebel Forces began to forge new organizational structures that would permit them to be battle-ready in those new and complicated days to come.

The CIA was not able to organize any effective counter-revolutionary organization from within Cuban society; the national bourgeoisie and their allies were unable to construct an organized counter-revolutionary opposition.

The Agrarian Reform of 1959 defined territory and positions: one was either with the Revolution or against the Revolution. The disaster of the Trujillo Conspiracy in August 1959 and the traitorous movement headed by Hubert Matos in October of that same year were excellent proof of how strong the Revolution was and how weak the enemy’s manoeuvres were.

Faced with all this evidence, the EisenhowerAdministration decided to commit all its strength into the operations that had been in the works since before 1959: annihilate the Cuban Revolution which, from its birth, was the finest example of the historical confrontation between Cuba and the United States.

When declassified documents were published in the U.S. and interesting documents on the subject of Cuba-U.S. relations during 1959 were pulled together by Cuban historians, it became obvious that the Eisenhower Administration was convinced by this date that the only way to orchestrate a Cuban political and military collapse would be by an armed attack from outside. Because of these documents declassified in recent years by the U.S. government, the Revolution’s theory during the last forty years of confrontation has been clearly substantiated: complex under-cover operations to overthrow the Cuban Revolution have been a reality.

On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower approved a programme of covert operations against Cuba. Propaganda, especially radio propaganda, was fundamental for the development of these activities.

We must ask the following question: why does radio propaganda acquire such a high priority ranking?

We must agree with the criteria of David Wise and Thomas B. Ross who state: “The appearance of transistor radios in the 50’s intensified one of the most sinister, hidden and less known aspects of the use of electronics in the Cold War. This is the war of the spoken word, taking place in the air waves and used by combatants who are thousands of miles apart and who will never meet each other.”

They continue: “The low cost transistor has given this hidden war a whole new importance. Thousands of people in the Middle East, Latin America and Asia who cannot read, can still be reached with this propaganda method, used by both sides.”

In appreciation of the modus operandi of radio propaganda, the authors conclude: “U.S. radio activities include the full range of public programming, open, well-known and announced by the Voice of America, including CIA top secret transmissions in the Middle East and in other parts of the world. Between them there is a series of radio operations; black, grey, secret and semi-secret. Radio Swan of the CIA never tried to cover up much, due to the fact that it was involved in Bay of Pigs operations...”

It is not foolish to consider, moreover, that the use of radio propaganda for subversive activities was already being intensely and professionally developed against the socialist nations and that USIA had the experience and feasibility studies backing up this decision to use radio propaganda. Operation PB Success against Guatemala in 1954 was an irrefutable demonstration of this operational idea.

In the ideological war of the 50’s and 60’s, where radio propaganda played a central part, U.S. government perception was that this was as important a strategy as the arms race. In President Kennedy’s words on July 7, 1962, speaking to a group of CIA specialists: “As military measures are turning more deadly, and a growing number of nations have access to these, subversive war, the war of guerrillas and other confrontational forms will acquire greater importance. As thermonuclear weapons become more powerful and the opportunities to use them become further reduced, subversive war takes on an increasingly important role.”(1)

In a conference given in the Central Political Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior in 1999: “Of course, it was particularly the use of radio –rather, the use of radio transmitters– that has been most effective, because of its ability to reach the listener directly, and it is precisely this means by which most of the propaganda enters, and it is for this reason that the system has been designed, if we can call it that, made up of a number of radio stations, both legal and illegal, all pointing at our country.”(2)

The programme of undercover operations approved by President Eisenhower on March 17, 1960 defined in detail how to use radio propaganda against Cuba from that moment on. The most important aspects were:

• Creation and use of a high-powered short -and medium- wave radio station.

• The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States would be responsible for the setting up of a station outside the U.S. territorial limits and for having it ready to operate in sixty days.

• Swan Island in the Caribbean was chosen for the station which at the beginning must be top secret but just before beginning transmissions its cover would be that of a commercial station.

• With the support of the U.S. Navy, an airport was built on the island and transmitters and all the equipment for a radio station were brought in.

• On May 17, 1960, Radio Swan commenced transmitting to Cuba.

• Even though the cover for Radio Swan was a commercial radio station, space would be sold to counter-revolutionary organizations, émigré publications, radio stations of counter-revolutionary groups. The radio transmissions were recorded in the U.S. and then sent to the station.

According to declassified CIA documents, Radio Swan became the voice of Cuban counter-revolution both inside and outside of Cuba. These sources also claim that by the end of 1960 the station began to lose credibility as a result of declarations and viewpoints stated by the various groups having programmes. It appears that the squabbles between the various organizations, the absence of a proper message and the use of flimsy and nonsensical information, easily discernible by the audiences, contributed towards the weakening of the station’s public image. Audiences quickly discovered that false information was being transmitted. On one occasion, it was said that there were 3,000 Soviets in a park in Santiago de Cuba, and to show up the lack of coordination among the various transmitting groups, there were programmes that said that militia members who became counter-revolutionaries would be considered to be heroes, while in other programmes they said that they would be hanged...

As the time for the landing of Assault Brigade 2506 drew near, according to the plan set up by Operation Pluto, the CIA took complete control of all the station’s transmissions in order to offer tactical support to the invaders.

From March 27, 1961, Radio Swan only broadcasted information about psychological warfare as it related to Operation Pluto and the counter-revolutionary organizations in Cuba. During the landing of the mercenaries at the Bay of Pigs, information was broadcast as tactical support for the mercenaries: monitoring by stations in Latin America and the Caribbean and by international news agencies revealed that a completely erroneous vision of the facts was being presented.

Once the U.S. special services realized that Operation Pluto was about to fail on the Cuban coastline, the station immediately changed its message in order to give information about the defeat of Assault Brigade 2506, indicating that Soviet armament had deterred the advance of the mercenaries and that these were now on their way to the Escambray Mountains to begin a guerrilla war, joining rebels already operating in the region.

Days later, the station returned to its normal programming, after it had transmitted on a 24 hour schedule during the Operation. It offered news about counter-revolutionary activities but avoided making any comments that would be interpreted as inciting rebellion. In October 1961, it transmitted in short- and medium-wave, from 5 a.m. to 6 a.m., from 12:30 to 2 p.m. and from 6 p.m. to 12:15. Programming consisted of news and commercials. In this research, there was access to important OSE considerations regarding anti-Cuban radio broadcasts coming from the U.S. directed against Cuba in the 1960-1961 period.

In a report dated April 7, 1961, an expert states: “Last year the Spanish Voice of America radio station returned to the air. From March of that year, as we have already informed, our Navy Intelligence Bureau (G-2 Naval) had information about U.S. Naval vessel and plane operations on Swan Island, territory belonging to Honduras. Unemployed persons from the Cayman Islands have been contracted and taken to that island to work on the CIA project called “Independent Radio Cuba”.

“At the beginning of May, 1960, the programme “For Cuba and By Cuba” went on the air, transmitted from U.S. territory, and recorded in Miami, transmitted by phone to WRUL studios in New York and from there re-transmitted towards Cuba five times a week at 9 p.m. Andres Vargas Gomez, a traitor and a thief, is the man behind this project; once the editorial material was written, he supervised the transmissions, insulting and lying to our nation and its Revolution which is as Cuban as the palm trees. This programme is the soap-box for loud mouthed individuals like the Leyva brothers, Humberto Medrano, Sergio Carbo, Jose Ignacio Rasco, Nino Diaz, Pepito Rivero, Ricardo Lorie and others.”

“Since August 1960, the so-called Swan Radio is on the air appearing to be operated by a supposed commercial company, the Gibraltar Steamship Company, based in New York; this is nothing more than a cover for the CIA. They set it up in Swan Island in a short period of time, bringing in equipment and the logistics to ensure the broadcasts against Cuba. It seems that the CIA needs more than their clandestine transmissions and their programmes from Radio Santo Domingo, WRUL and VOA.(...) Every evening Swan Radio broadcasts four (4) hours in Spanish and the recordings are made in the U.S., flown in twice a week to Swan Island. (...) Swan Radio spreads lies and rumours about our people and our revolutionary leaders.” (...) Swan Radio is also a CIA communications medium to keep in touch with the terrorist groups that lurk in the Escambray while they flee from our militia members and revolutionary forces that are personally lead by our Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz.”

To underline the connection of the station with intelligence activities, the report goes on: “Swan Radio encourages people to turn into traitors, and at the same time coded transmissions send orders to the secret agents of Yankee intelligence who are living in Cuba.”

The expert goes on to note that radio programmes are prepared in Florida to be broadcast to Cuba from the Old Channel of the Bahamas, using the so-called Independent Radio Cuba programme to deliver instructions on how to sabotage the island. Independent Radio Cuba is a private enterprise with six transmitting stations in Florida and Louisiana.

Coincidentally, it is noted that in the port of Matias de Galvez in Guatemala, a ten-kilowatt radio station was set up and its broadcasts are directed towards Belize on announced frequencies. It is possible that the station also transmits to Cuba since “it could also help out if an invasion on Cuban territory were to be announced, given the fact that because of its strength and geographical position, broadcast signals can readily enter Cuban territory. It also adds the following information: “the chauffeur of the Guatemalan puppet Miguel Ydigoras drives to the port of Matias de Galvez twice a week to take tapes recorded by a Cuban in Guatemala City.”(3)

Messages broadcast by Swan Radio are part of the general picture of Psychological Warfare. The following examples are interesting.

On October 26, 1960, in the programme, National Liberation Hour, broadcast by Swan Radio at 8:30 p.m., directed by Enrique Huerta, with the collaboration of Angel del Cerro, Pepita Riera and Luis Conte Aguero, information was revealed about the actions of Operation Peter Pan, organized by the U.S. government as one of its elements of Psychological Warfare against the Cuban nation. The text was:

ATTENTION CUBANS! REMEMBER HOW A FEW DAYS AGO DURING THIS SAME PROGRAMME, LIBERATION HOUR, WE TOLD YOU ABOUT MANY OF THE LAWS THAT WERE TO BE INSTITUTED LATER BY THE GOVERNMENT, LIKE FOR EXAMPLE THE URBAN REFORM, WE TOLD YOU THAT THEY WERE GOING TO DO IT AND THEY DID, SO NOW WE ARE TELLING YOU THIS: THE NEXT LAW WILL BE THAT THEY WILL TAKE AWAY YOUR CHILDREN AGED 5 TO 18 YEARS OLD, THEY WILL TAKE THEM AWAY TO INDOCTRINATE THEM AND WHEN YOU GET THEM BACK THEY WILL HAVE BEEN TURNED INTO A MATERIALISTIC BEAST AND SO FIDEL WILL BECOME THE SUPREME MOTHER OF CUBA.

The same programme also broadcast this, in an effort to sow the seeds of panic in the people:

FIDEL IS PLANNING TO GATHER TOGETHER 10,000 MOTHERS AND CHILDREN TO PEACEFULLY INVADE CAIMANERA AND AMONG THIS GROUP THERE WILL BE PRENSA LATINA JOURNALISTS SO THAT WHEN SOLDIERS DO ANYTHING, WHETHER IT WILL BE TO THROW BOMBS OR WATER, PICTURES WILL BE TAKEN AND THE ENTIRE WORLD WILL KNOW WHAT THE PICTURES ARE SHOWING”... ”THAT IS WHY WE ARE TELLING YOU THE MILITIA MEMBERS THAT YOU MUST LEAVE THE RED TYRANNY, YOU MUST RISE UP, BECAUSE IF YOU DO NOT, WHEN THE TYRANNY FALLS, ALL THE DEAD WILL BE AVENGED”

Supposed broadcasts and agents in Cuban territory are included in the programme Freedom Lightening from the Navy Diary, on October 27, 1960, directed by Jose Antonio Rivero, announcers Arturo Artalejos and Alberto Gandero. The following message reads: BOAC IN EXILE TO BOAC IN THE ESCAMBRAY. I WROTE THE NIECE’S MESSAGE, TO PANCHO VILLA IN THE ESCAMBRAY THEY ARE PREPARING ANOTHER MESSENGER PIGEON THAT WILL BE WELL-LOADED.”

When the Mercenary Brigade invasion began, Swan Radio sent a message that was meant to be an announcement for the entire fifth column, that Operation Pluto had broken out. The message read: “ALERT! ALERT! LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE RAINBOW. THE FISH WILL SOON BE COMING OUT. THE BOY IS AT HOME. VISIT HIM. THE SKY IS BLUE. PUT THE INFORMATION IN THE TREE. THE TREE IS GREEN AND BROWN. THE LETTERS ARRIVED WELL. THE LETTERS ARE WHITE. THE FISH WILL SOON BE OUT. THE FISH IS RED”

What follows are war bulletins prepared by the Psychological Warfare group, directed by David Phillips.

Bulletin No. 1 April 17.

Before dawn, Cuban patriots from the cities and from the mountains began a battle to liberate our country from the despotic government of Fidel Castro and to liberate Cubans from the cruel repression of international Communism.

This struggle continues in the glorious tradition of Jose Marti. The uprising of the Cuban people against the tyrannical oppressors has only one aim: the final recovery of Cuba’s freedom.

Today’s historical act is the result of many months’ planning and the efforts of Cubans who at one time had risked their lives in the struggle against tyranny. These patriots today shoulder the ongoing task of saving the revolution which is being cynically betrayed. They represent all walks of life and social groups.

In the course of many months, contacts have been made with the Cuban military community by means of several revolutionary organizations, and today these silent combatants are carrying out missions assigned by the revolutionary commandos.

In their undying desire to ensure freedom, the Cuban people are arming themselves in order to wipe out the despicable foreign oppressor; they are inspired by the dream of an inevitable victory and are convinced that other nations who aspire to the freedom of this hemisphere will join and support the struggle, both morally and materially, in this critical time. There has never been such a just cause.

Bulletin No. 2 April 17.

The Cuban Revolutionary Council issues a communiqué about the successful landing of military equipment and personnel in the area of the Bay of Pigs in Matanzas Province.

Overcoming any armed resistance offered by Castro followers, large amounts of food and weapons reached internal resistance forces that are now engaged in active combat.

For several months different revolutionary groups that are now associated with the Cuban Revolutionary Council have been distributing revolutionary material and equipment at selected sites in Cuba.

The remote and sparsely populated area of the Zapata Swamp has been used as an area for the hiding of weapons and equipment that will later be used by resistance fighters in the Escambray and other similar regions.

Wherever the members of the CRC are found actively engaged in these dramatic events taking place in Cuba, their statements shall be communicated to the press solely by the CRC spokesman, Dr. Antonio Silio.

Bulletin No. 3 April 17.

The Cuban Revolutionary Council announces that the principal battle against Castro will take place in the next few hours. Today’s action consisted mainly of efforts to supply and support the forces that have been mobilized and trained on Cuban territory in the past few months. The powerful army of invisible patriot-soldiers has received their instructions to deliver the final blow that will liberate their beloved homeland.

Our combatants in every city and town will receive, in a manner known only to them, the message that will unleash the tremendous wave of internal fighting against the tyrant. The spokesman of the CRC stated: “I predict that before tomorrow morning, the island of Cuba will rise up en masse in a coordinated wave of sabotage and rebellion that will sweep away all traces of Communism from our country.”

Evidently, details of the event to come cannot be made public at this time. However, we can reveal that the patriots have been instructed to cut lines of communications, destroy transportation systems and mobilize against Castro.

In addition, we expect that before dawn, the Cuban patriots will be attacking the dwindling numbers of militia who have not yet come over to our side. Our information from Cuba indicates that the majority of militia in the countryside has deserted the Castro cause.

According to the press release of April 16, our clandestine radio station has been delivering instructions to the insurrectional movement throughout the island. In a coded message, yesterday’s broadcast said that “the fish will soon rise up.” It is common knowledge that the fish is a Christian symbol of resistance. When the fish appears in a vertical position it symbolizes that internal rebellion is in full swing. The fish will arise tonight!

Bulletin No. 4 April 18.

Peasants, workers and militia are joining the freedom fighters and assisting in the expanded area liberated by the revolutionary commandos.

The Cuban Revolutionary Council announces that the Cuban freedom fighters in the area of Matanzas are being attacked by Soviet armoured tanks and Mig planes which have destroyed a large amount of medical supplies and equipment.

This humanitarian materiel was intended to break the chains of Communism. The Cuban Revolutionary Council is deeply grateful for the countless messages of support and encouragement that are arriving from all over the world. This international solidarity is convincing proof that nations who espouse freedom are rejecting the Communist regime of slavery that Castro has forced on the Cuban nation.

Bulletin No. 5 April 19.

Despite the continuous Soviet Mig, armoured tank and artillery attacks, the Cuban Revolutionary Council has concluded the first planned phase of its military operation in the south of Cuba.

This phase included the successful establishing of guerrilla troops in the Escambray Mountains.

Many of our forces from the area of the Bay of Pigs have moved north of Cienfuegos; this has allowed them to reinforce the patriots who are engaged in combat in the mountains.

We can also reveal that additional guerrilla units have infiltrated Matanzas Province. The heroic actions of a small force resisting the Soviet tanks, artillery and aerial attacks during the past 24 hours has made this possible.

Bulletin No. 6 April 19.

The Cuban Revolutionary Council would like to make an emphatic and immediate statement in response to surprising uninformed public announcements.

The statement indicates that “several thousand” Cuban patriots fell in combat in southern Cuba. This is a statement that will no doubt please Castro but it will discourage the Cuban people who are anxiously awaiting the moment when the chains that tie them to Communism will be smashed.

The recent landings in Cuba have been constantly, but incorrectly, described as an invasion. In reality, it was a landing of supplies and support for our patriots who have been fighting in Cuba for months now and whose numbers are in the hundreds, not in the thousands.

Unfortunately, we admit to tragic losses in action today in a small force that courageously resisted the Soviet tanks and artillery fire while being attacked by Migs in a heroic action that allowed as many as possible from the landing force to reach the Escambray Mountains.

We did not expect to defeat Castro immediately or without setbacks. It is also true that we cannot expect to confront Soviet weapons sent by the Soviet advisors with no losses whatsoever. We will do it and we will survive!

The struggle for the freedom of six million Cubans continues! In this context it is important to point out some characteristics of these activities, by Swan Radio, on the occasion of the landing of the Mercenary Brigade at the Bay of Pigs. David Phillips had chosen “the fish” as a symbol to represent the counter-revolution because it had been the resistance symbol for Christians in Roman times. In a cable sent to the CIA station in Miami on March 27, 1961, Phillips stated that it was time to inform Jose Miro Cardona, president of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, that the fish would become the CRC symbol.

The religious theme had been used earlier by the CIA in its Psychological War. The first publication by the Revolutionary Democratic Front “Rescue, depicted Fidel as the Anti-Christ; also, Phillips’ delegate at the CIA station in Miami “Douglas Gupton” was connected to Catholic leaders in Florida and Central America in order to coordinate a unified Church response to the Revolution.

In August 1960, David Phillips had contracted a public relations agency in New York, Lem Jones Associates, to take charge of publicity for the activities of the counter revolutionary organizations directed and controlled by the CIA in its Operation Pluto.

The bulletins published herein to demonstrate the events of the invasion, were put together by the Psychological Warfare Group, under Phillips. The CRC really had no hand in this: the leaders were ensconced at a site near Miami, incommunicado with the outside, awaiting the creation of a beach head in Cuba so that they might organize a Cuban provisional government. Then they would have a pretext to ask for U.S. military intervention and thus legitimize direct military aggression against Cuba under the cloak of the OAS.

David Atlee Phillips was the kingpin in the Psychological War against Cuba, both in this phase and later on. Just who was this CIA employee?

In the book The CIA and the Media. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. House of Representatives. Ninety-fifth Congress. First and Second Sessions. December 27, 28, 28, January 4, 5 and April 20, 1979, published by the U.S. Government Press in Washington, 1978, a speech by Phillips as representative of the Retired Intelligence Officers Association is published. It spoke of CIA activity in social communications media. It states:

“From 1954 to 1975 I was a professional intelligence officer. Before that I was a free-lance journalist abroad for several years, editor and owner of an English language newspaper and at the same time an intelligence operative.”

He never speaks of his participation in the Psychological War against Cuba and his presence in intelligence before the year 1959.

According to information sources, Phillips was recruited as an under cover agent of the CIA in 1950 in Chile; in 1954 he took part in the CIA group that promoted the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 (Operation PB Success). Between 1958-1960 he was the illegal CIA officer in Havana, using a job in a public relations agency as his cover, obviously monitoring the revolutionary struggle against the tyranny and working on several tasks related to intelligence and political-ideological subversion. He participated in the preparations for an assassination attempt on the Commander in Chief in the second semester of 1961, an attempt frustrated by Cuban State Security. He was the director of plans for Psychological Warfare against Cuba in Operation Pluto of 1961 and Operation Mongoose in 1962. He was active in paramilitary operations launched on the Cuban coast from station JM Wave and he is considered to be the founder of the counter revolutionary and terrorist organization Alpha 66. In 1963, he was involved in anti-Cuban activity from the CIA station in Mexico City. In 1965 he was chief of the CIA station in Santo Domingo, participating in activities against the revolutionary movement headed by Francisco Caamano Deno; later he was chief of the CIA Taskforce for Chile, organized the assassination attempt plan against the Commander in Chief in Chile in 1971, directing CIA undercover activities against the Allende government. He was appointed chief of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division in 1975. He was retired after the Watergate scandal.

Swan Radio was a part of the system of anti-Cuban radio broadcasts designed by the U.S. government to wage the Psychological War, part of the group known as Radio Cuba Libre (Radio Free Cuba) under the direction of Roman Pucinski, expert in Psychological Warfare in the U.S. Strategic Services Office during World War II and having a distinguished service record in the Cold War developing political-ideological diversion activities against the USSR and Poland, promoting dissident groups in those countries.

According to researcher Luis Andres Betancourt in his book Swan Radio: The Voice of the Pigs: “The network designed by Pucinski covered Swan, WROL, WGBS in Miami, WKWF in Key West, WWL in New Orleans, WMIE which survives today as the counter revolutionary WQBA “la cubanisima,” Radio Santo Domingo and Radio Americas. It was also used by naval and air units and specialized personnel acting under cover of the Coast Guard, the Geodetic Survey and other U.S. agencies.”

Something to remember in the radio activities developed by Swan Radio was the connection with the radio station of the CMQ Company, owned by the brothers Goar and Abel Mestre. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba decided to shut down the station on September 13, 1960 due to the positions taken by its owners to boycott the Revolution.

CMQ was one of the main sources of manpower for Swan Radio: Enrique Huertas, Luis Conte Aguero, Angel del Cerro, Carlos Castaneda, Pepita Riera, Luis Aguiar Leon, just to name a few. It is not surprising that David A. Phillips, journalist and public relations expert, was present during selection processes: this man’s presence in Havana was not always confined to the noble profession of journalism.

The planning of radio broadcasts against Cuba in the period before the Bay of Pigs invasion required the cooperation of the National Security Council, the Intelligence Community and the President John F. Kennedy in the Cuban work carried out by the USIA.

In this respect, the outgoing USIA director Henry Loomis wrote a report for Edward Murrow, the next appointed USIA director. On 10 February 1961, Loomis delivers the balance sheet on Cuban activities developed by the USIA. With respect to resources utilized: USIA

• More than a dozen high-powered short-wave transmitters in the U.S.. Seven transmitters with a total capacity of 559kw for the hour long Spanish language broadcasts each evening at 8 p.m. This programme is re-broadcast an hour later from two transmitters on the west coast with a total capacity of 200kw.

• Besides the short-wave broadcast, the Agency has space on local radio stations throughout all of Latin America. Approximately 140 of these stations re-transmit fragments of short-wave USIA broadcasts. In addition, the USIA contracts for about 400 hours per day on 1,500 radio stations in Latin America.

• The VOA broadcasts 4 and a half hours daily in English on short-wave, for Latin America.CIA

• Swan Radio: a medium wave transmitter of 50kw located on Swan Island off the Honduras coast. Swan broadcasts 6 days a week, 8 hours daily in Spanish and half an hour in English; it also has a short-wave transmitter of 7 and a half kw with the same programmes.

The CIA has also used portable transmitters.

PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS

• WRUL has five short-wave transmitters in Boston with a total of 220kw. At the present time they broadcast several hours a day in Spanish and English for Latin America. Even though they broadcast a lot of music, the CIA placed programmes during broadcasts until Swan Radio commenced service.

• Half a dozen commercial medium wave radio stations, can be heard in Cuba, especially late at night. WBGS of Miami has the best coverage; the CIA at present programmes 2 hours in Spanish, one early morning hour and one a bit later.

• WGBS broadcasts 50 kw per day, but it must reduce to 10 kw at night. The CIA tries to get special permission from the Federal Communications Commission to increase the capacity of WGBS, but until today, it has not been able to do so.

Last year a monitoring expert from the VOA visited Cuba and obtained complete exact information about the reception of medium and short-wave transmissions, city by city. It was determined that besides WGBS, stations in Atlanta, Nashville and New Orleans have sufficient reception in certain areas, especially late at night.

FACTS

• There are an estimated 1,100,000 radio sets in Cuba; of these, 10 percent are short-wave.

• In Cuba there are approximately 135 medium-wave transmitters. Even though most of them have a low capacity, at least two of them are 50 kw. Most of these stations are concentrated in urban areas. In general, 25 FM transmitters are used to re-broadcast. Six low potential transmitters are now in use, but a transmitter of 100 kw was acquired last year in Switzerland and will soon be in service.

• Most of the medium-wave transmitters, especially in the Havana area are able to, effectively, block medium-wave stations from abroad. Since radio in Cuba is not independent, it can be assigned the task of interfering with transmissions without affecting regular programming.

• Cuba has attempted to interfere with short-wave transmissions, but it has been difficult. If Cuba would like to do so, it could change the frequencies of its powerful transmitters and interfere with commercial stations in the U.S. as far north as New York and as far west as Mississippi.

• In February 1960, the Senate passed the Regional North American Transmissions Treaty, signed by Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and the West Indies. The treaty which had been on the negotiating table for ten years, assigned certain frequencies and capacities to different countries with the express goal of reducing interference among the countries. If the U.S. broadcasts openly to Cuba on medium-wave bands, it would be a violation of this treaty.

Due to the above-mentioned, the CIA and the USIA share work against Cuba in the following fashion:

• VOA short-wave transmissions go towards an audience in America. Latin American topics of general interest are discussed. Cuba-U.S. relations are explained not just to Cubans, but to Latin Americans, in an objective non-emotional tone. Short-wave radio broadcasts are associated with the delivery of materiel to local stations for their broadcasts.

• Swan Radio is for Cubans speaking to Cubans. Its goal is to excite the listener, to ridicule and deride the regime. The CIA programme on WGBS, when speaking Cuban to Cuban, is designed to be more objective, to maintain a certain level of accuracy and a more reasonable tone.

• All evidence indicates that both VOA and Swan Radio have a broad audience. Many people listen to both: the VOA is for confirmation of information; Swan Radio is for passion. Many insist that Swan Radio has broadcast many unfounded rumours and so has very low credibility. The CIA is aware of this and is carefully observing the situation, but everyone agrees that Swan Radio tends to excite the listener. It cannot have the same broadcast policy that VOA has. The WGBS programming is just beginning.

• VOA has been requested to build a medium-wave station in Florida. Research has been made. It is not recommended to do so because it would be a violation of the regional treaty on broadcasts; it could interfere in the principal cities and Cuba would have an excuse in Latin America to interfere in U.S. domestic broadcasts.

This has been, briefly, the report of the out-going USIA director. After the Bay of Pigs defeat the Kennedy administration, in 1962, designed a coherent system of subversive activity to destroy Cuba’s socialist revolution using violence, having demonstrated the vulnerability of the fundaments of U.S. national security doctrine, the invalidity of its geopolitical thesis of geographic fatalism, and having smashed the Monroe myth around which U.S. policies of domination in the Americas revolved.

After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy strategy includes two points: developing Operation Mongoose from the end of 1961 until October 1962, and the Multiple Track Programme of 1963 that is cut short by Kennedy’s assassination in Dallas on 22 November 1963.

Operation Mongoose was a programme made up of measures that Cuban counter revolutionary organizations proposed to carry out, subordinated to counter revolutionary structures abroad that were directed by the CIA, the unfolding of political activities, military plans, acts of sabotage and the intensification of intelligence. An outstanding feature has been Psychological Warfare; radio propaganda was its most important arm. General Edward Lansdale was appointed head of Operation Mongoose. At CIA headquarters in Langley Virginia, William Harvey assumed the headship of Force W, responsible for the direction of the anti-Cuban operation. A special unit was established in Florida to carry out the covert CIA operations against Cuba: JM/Wave, which would become in practice, responsible for Operation Mongoose, as a special CIA directive. Theodore Shackley was the head and Gordon Campbell, his lieutenant.

In January 1962, the Operation Mongoose working group put together what can be called the central doctrine of its project, pointing out that the “aim of the U.S. is to help the Cubans overthrow the communist regime within the island and to install a new government with which the U.S. could peacefully coexist.”

“Project Cuba,” as it later came to be known, assembled the following:

• The relationship between an uprising and a political movement

• Uprising and rebellion

• The carrying out of commando operations as support for acts of sabotage within the country and the promotion of armed resistance.

The original Mongoose project included thirty-three tasks expressed in seven plans that followed subversive lines (organizational, political, economic warfare, Psychological Warfare, espionage and activities for eventual military aggression against the island). Mongoose’s plans and tasks were to be accomplished in structured phases as follows:

• March – commence operations

• August 1 – institute subversive mechanisms

• August – September – increase activities and resistance on the entire island

• Early October – generalized revolt

• End of October – reconstruction of a Cuban government

It should be noted that the confrontation of the State Security agencies whose essential strategy was outlined in strategic and political terms by the Commander in Chief and the revolutionary direction, backed up by the people-revolution-defence triad, as well as the outcome of the October Crisis in 1962, put an end to Operation Mongoose.

After this event, the United States had to re-think its programme of anti-Cuban subversive activities without giving up on their determination to militarily invade the island, as Fidel Castro stated in the Central Report to the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party.

With its Multiple Track Programme of 1963, the administration of John F. Kennedy proposed the annihilation of the revolution by means of a military invasion of Cuba, making use of a brigade of Cuban counter revolutionaries trained by the U.S. Army and the subversive structures created for that purpose, in order to destabilize Cuban Socialism by re-establishing diplomatic relations between Cuba and the U.S..

What were the goals, aims and directions delineated by Mongoose to carry out the operations of a psychological war and which would have to be supported by USIA and CIA propaganda, an important element of which was the radio propaganda to which we have been referring above in this report?

The partially declassified Mongoose document contains 10 acts of Psychological Warfare, 5 of which still remaining in CIA secret files.

Activities to be developed should mainly be:

• Organization of American States (OAS)

• United Nations Organization

• U.S. government officials

• U.S. news agencies

• U.S. diplomatic corps

• Counter revolutionary groups under the control of the Cuban Revolutionary Council who would organize tours through the various Latin American nations

• U.S. government support for Latin American countries

• Create a “crusade” mentality, human freedom being the goal

• Visits to Cuban refugee camps in Florida by important

personalities from the U.S. and Latin America

• Publicize information about Cuban deserters who had held important jobs in Cuban politics

• Dramatize stories about the lives of the refugees, representing a wide sector of the social life of Cuba

The aims of Psychological Warfare by means of propaganda in general would be:

• Ensure official condemnation of communism in Cuba in order to influence public opinion in Latin America and the world

• Denounce to the world the subordination of Cuba to a foreign power

• Create psychological conditions favouring popular revolt

• Commit U.S. prestige in the support of elements in Cuba that take an anti-communist stance

• Influence foreign politicians and their advisors, as well as intellectuals and important citizen groups

• Foster the commitment of U.S. politicians, intellectuals, union leaders, youth and clergy in the fight against communism in Cuba

• Organize special interest groups to set up contacts in Cuba and to influence U.S. public opinion

• Make use of the testimony of influential individuals in order to ask for support for the battle against communism in Cuba

• Maintain permanent information sources for the Cuban people about these goals

• Create a social support base in Cuba in opposition to the Revolutionary Government, one that would ask for military aid once a provisional government would be installed in Cuba

• Develop the motivational factors of the Cuban population vis a vis freedom.

• Demonstrate concern for the plight of Cuban refugees in Florida and other states

• Demonstrate the failure of the Cuban government in accomplishing the promises of the July 26th Programme

The methods to be used along with these propagandistic activities are:

• Personal and official anti-Cuban diplomacy

• Statements made by heads of state and government criticizing programmes of economic and social development in Cuba

• Fabricated information about political persecution in Cuba so that UN Commissions will be forced to research the situation on the island

• Official U.S. government statements geared towards keeping up the pressure on Cuba

• Wielding influence on Latin American nations, NATO and Spain, in the last case taking advantage of Spanish historical links with Cuba

• Religious programmes, interviews with a variety of émigrés to influence Cuban public opinion, keeping in mind the capacity of radio broadcasts from the U.S.

• Publishing ideological messages, using the figure of Jose Marti

• Visits by Jacqueline Kennedy to refugee camps in order to demonstrate the concern of the U.S. government for these people

• Issue written material about anti-communist struggle

• Make use of statistics to demonstrate the dimensions of the Cuban exodus to the U.S. and other countries

In all these activities, U.S. federal agencies will play an important part, and the CIA and USIA particularly will be key in the promotion of Psychological Warfare. On July 20, 1962, the USIA draws up a balance sheet of its anti-Cuban activities, underlining that its goals consist in utilizing all social communication measures to mobilize Latin American public opinion against the Cuban government while highlighting Cuba’s economic disaster that resulted from its totalitarian characteristics and its total dependence on the dictates of the USSR and China.

Short-wave radio broadcasts are incredibly important to these plans so that communications will remain open with the people of the island and will undermine their support of and confidence in the Revolution.

The fundamental themes underlying the USIA actions are clearly to be appreciated when reading this report.

On an economic level, we can see emphasis on:

• Deterioration of the island’s economy

• The Cuban government’s inability to satisfy the basic needs of its populace

• Poor administration of a socialist economy

• Comparisons to the supposed failures of USSR agriculture and the famines in the People’s Republic of China

• The struggle between Fidel Castro and the old-guard Cuban communists due to the economic chaos and the government’s administrative incapacity

Referring to the refugee situation:

• Increasing numbers of refugees coming from all sectors in society, including blacks and low-income groups, those which at the beginning were staunch supporters of the Revolution

• Using refugee eye-witness accounts to paint a picture of lack of food, growing unemployment and devastated economy

In regards to the subject of the worker in the revolution:

• Show repression of the union movement

• Low salaries and poor labour conditions

• Growing unemployment and a lengthening work week

Referring to students and intellectuals, the USIA recognizes that this constitutes the most difficult area to target. The report states that, paradoxically, this is the group which is least susceptible to the call of logic and reason. It points out that here there is such a strong element of emotion that the USIA has not been able to find any way to penetrate it. Some of the subjects which have been used on these groups are: a rejection of supposed mass executions, immediate and chronic economic problems, attacks on the Church and social structures, militarizing tendencies on the work force and other limitations on individual liberties. These have not had a noticeable impact. It states: “the Messianic attraction of Castro on the intellectuals and students unleashes a gut response that cannot be subdued.”

Three of the nine hours broadcast daily in Spanish on VOA deal directly with Cuba. There are 14 programmes, including newscasts, commentaries, drama, sports and news about Cuba, matters relating to agriculture and history, all following the goals set by Psychological Warfare.

When this document is analysed and criticized, one cannot leave out an aspect that reveals the inability of the USIA to present a coherent and logical message to its Cuban audience. This is the opinion of the USIA expert when referring to the intended psychological operations:

“in all psychological planning special attention must be paid to the avoiding of any information, as much as possible, that would point towards a return to the state of affairs existing in Cuba prior to the Revolution. All information used must be directed to remind the common people that the anti-Castro movement is designed to develop programmes that will encourage the social and economic hopes of the Cuban people” (4) (8)

It is recommended to use all kinds of diplomatic, economic and psychological pressure in order to topple the government of Fidel Castro without the obvious participation of the United States. At the time of the October Crisis, the U.S. government drafted a special plan to use radio broadcasts on October 20, 1962. Kennedy himself instructed the USIA to significantly increase its capacity for transmissions to Cuba, their frequency, broadcast times and the number of stations broadcasting directly to Cuba. In this plan, the USIA director outlined the strategy to be followed during the crisis about these criteria and measures:

• After Kennedy’s speech on October 22, 1962, the USIA would unleash the plan to saturate Cuba with information broadcasted 24 hours a day;

• In order to avoid what happened in Hungary in 1956 and at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, when a lack of coordination in broadcasting schedules from the U.S. occurred, the USIA would take control of the direction and centralization of the entire broadcast system towards Cuba during the period of crisis:

• Eight stations in the USIA network would be united: five commercial stations and WGBS, WMIE and WKWF which would be inserted into the Cuban refugee programme and which hypothetically would be controlled by the CIA: The network would be made up of the following stations:

WGBS, Miami. Transmitting 2 hours a day in Spanish WMIE, Miami. One special programme late at night and early in the morning. WSB, Atlanta. WWL, New Orleans. WKWF, Key West. Transmitting in Spanish late at night. WRUL, New York. Transmitting to Cuba; after VOA, this is the station with the largest audience in Cuba. In a crisis it is recommended that programmes should run 24 hours a day. Armed Forces Radio in Guantanamo. Radio Americas - Known earlier as Swan Radio.

During the October Crisis, the USIA developed its goals in three directions: to gain support for the blockade measures, to create conditions that would ensure the populace’s acceptance of any measures adopted by the U.S. government, to stimulate the people’s social apathy towards and non-collaboration with the Revolution.

These were totally unattainable goals. There had never been such a brilliant statesman as Fidel Castro during those shining days in October, backed by the unconditional total support of a nation that was ready to die in a nuclear holocaust rather than lose their independence, sovereignty and dignity.

According to the propaganda lines drawn up by the USIA on October 22, the subjects to be developed by the media were:

• Justify all U.S. government actions faced with the evidence of the presence of offensive missile on Cuban soil;

• USSR lies to the world affirming that the weapons were purely defensive

• Cuban government declarations were to be branded as lies

• Explain that the Cuban Revolution had sold out to communism and the USSR

• The risk of nuclear destruction for the Cuban people

• U.S. adopted quarantine as a defence for national interests

• The U.S. is a peace-loving nation and does not want a war with the Cuban people. There is only “friendship and hope” felt for “people who are denied their freedom”;

• The quarantine is adopted by the U.S. to secure its hemispheric safety and to protect the hemisphere from an extra-continental threat

• The Soviet military presence in Cuba intends to foment

aggression and subversion on the Latin American continent and to subjugate the Cuban people;

• Establish differences that characterize the existence of U.S. bases in Turkey and Soviet bases in Cuba;

• Underline the solidarity of the OAS towards U.S. actions, the opposition of Latin American governments to the building of missile bases in Cuba and the condemnation by these governments of Soviet military presence on the island.

The document pointed out that no message can be issued without following these lines approved by President Kennedy.

Even when a detailed description of these subjects appears lengthy, all of them are included to demonstrate, yet again, that in U.S. propaganda is a state policy associated with its national security interests.

On December 10, 1962, the USIA presented a work memo to the CIA referring to the using of émigrés in their broadcasts. The agency suggests the CIA follow these contents in their radio broadcasts to Cuba:

• Exert pressure and influence so that the USSR presence will result as expensive as possible;

• Stimulate economic sabotage and passive resistance in the populace.

The USIA recommends that groups and individuals participating in radio broadcasts be selected according to their prestige and credibility on the island, their occupational profile as spokespeople and the audience to whom the messages are being directed.

A call for open rebellion must be avoided; messages should provoke work stoppages, promote economic inefficiency, the squandering of resources and other sure forms of sabotage. For example: throw glass shards and nails on the highways, waste water in public buildings, throw sand on industrial equipment, waste electrical energy, damage sugar cane crops, request medical certificates to avoid working, etc...

The émigrés programmes would be presented as an autonomous emigrant activity without the participation of the USIA or any other government agency. Depending on concrete results, the USIA would use this information to publicize the existence of opposition in Cuba.

On March 19, 1963 the Vice-Director of Planning (Covert Operations) of the CIA sent the CIA Director the design for a programme to harass the Revolutionary Armed Forces and increase their unrest. The design is based on the following premises:

1. There is no possibility of internal army revolt in Cuba;

2. Actual policy excludes the public use of U.S. Armed Forces for intervention in Cuba;

3. Cuba is in no position to break relations with the USSR in order to establish relations with the U.S.;

Faced with this dilemma, the head of covert CIA operations proposed the so-called “tactical pincer strategy” consisting of an economic strangulation of the country in order to weaken and undermine the government at the same time as efforts are made to identify and establish communications channels with elements of unrest, non-communists and potential dissidents within the government power centres. In the latter case, it is proposed to prioritize key officers in the armed forces and the militia. It is not accidental that these plans coincide with the time of Operation Am-Lash, whose main agent was the traitor Rolando Cubela Secades.

To carry out this task, the CIA proposes to intensify the radio broadcasts together with other propaganda activities in order to try to establish access routes to officers and heads of the militia.

On December 29, 1962, in a speech delivered at the Orange Bowl in Florida, President Kennedy made statements that foreshadowed CIA policy of searching out support points within policy making centres in Cuba. Kennedy stated:

"... I believe that these are the principles of the great majority of Cuban people today, and I am confident that throughout the length and breadth of the island of Cuba, in the government itself, in the army and the militia, there are those who support faith in freedom, who have seen with disappointment the destruction of freedom on their island and are determined to restore freedom so that the Cuban people can have self-government. "

In 1963, in the U.S. Congress session on the “U.S. ideological offensive on international communism”, the existence of the Cuban Freedom Committee was revealed; according to declarations by witnesses “it was organized at the end of 1960 by U.S. citizens alarmed by the influence and direction of communism, as evidenced by the communists in the government of Cuba”. The CFC was operating Radio Cuba Libre, a non-profit private organization, according to its founders.

Experts in radio propaganda affirmed that Radio Cuba Libre was a cover organization created by the CIA just before The Bay of Pigs invasion. Mariada Arensberg, a militant in the CFC, testified before Congress: “The CFC is convinced that radio is the strongest propaganda weapon available in these Cold War times.” (5)(9)

This committee broadcast 15 hours daily to Cuba through WGBS, WKWF in Florida, WWL in New Orleans, Radio Santo Domingo and Radio Americas (a name used after the Bay of Pigs by the subversive station Swan Radio). These revelations coincide with the evaluation of Luis Adrian Betancourt in his book on Swan Radio. It is revealing to see the list of the advisory council of the CFC with all its connections to the U.S. government.

Information about the members of the Advisory Council to the CFC:

• Donald C. Bruce – U.S. Congressman, Republican, Indiana.

• Ovetta Culp Hobby, Editor, Houston Post.

• Samuel Meek, Vice-President, J. Walter Thompson co.

• Edward G. Miller, former sub-secretary of State for Latin American Affairs

• Peter O´Donnell – Dallas businessman

• Claiborne Pell – U.S. Senator, Democrat, Rhode Island

• Serafino Romualdi – Inter-American Representative of AFL-CIO

• Roman Pucinski – U.S. Congressman, Democrat, Illinois

• Harold Russel – National Commander, Veterans Society

• George S. Schuyler ‘ Associate Editor, Pittsburg Courier

• Walter Williams – former U.S. Secretary of Commerce

• President – John B. Mc Clatchy

• Executive Secretary – Mariada Arensburg

(The CTC headquarters are on 1737 H Street, N.W. Washington D.C., USA.)

Years later, revelations by the U.S. government pointed out that some of the CTC members were working for the CIA in the political-ideological diversion operations. One of the branches of anti-Cuban radio broadcasts dealt with counter revolutionary fake or pirate stations.

The first stations pretending to transmit from the Escambray Mountains and Oriente Province appeared in 1961. Between 1960 and 1970, 8 pirate stations were registered transmitting from Florida on ham radio bands during different times. According to experts, the broadcasts were of doubtful technical quality and very unprofessionally done.

In the seventies, the pirate stations dwindled to 4 but by the eighties, 14 of them were detected in operation. Since 1985, the fake stations pumped up their activities, coinciding with the creation of the subversive Radio Marti in 1985. In the eighties, the following were identifies: Voice of CID, Alpha 66, Radio Cuba Libre, Radio Antorcha Marti, Abdala, Radio Revolucion and the Voice of Progressive Youth, Cuba, transmitting from the U.S.. In 1985, the pirate Radio Caiman was registered transmitting from Guatemalan territory.

To avoid being controlled by the FCC, some of the fake stations have used legal station outlets in the Dominican Republic (Radio Clarin) and Venezuela (Ecos del Orbe), as well as El Salvador.

Among the goals of these fake stations, we find:

• Incite assassination attempts on the Commander in Chief

• Spread lies about the Commander in Chief

• Promote blockade economic measures

• Discredit political, social and economic changes made by the Revolution

• Encourage subversive and terrorist activities

• Discredit the image of the Revolution abroad

• Encourage illegal departures and the emigration of professionals

• Call upon passive resistance among the people

• Conduct propaganda campaigns filled with disinformation and lies, such as the supposed Cuban participation in human rights violations, drug trafficking, acts of international terrorism, etc.

In the case of Radio Caiman, the fake station tried to capture a young listener audience by playing the music of songwriters living on the island. Experts agree that there is a connection between information broadcast by the fake stations and the interests of the U.S. special services.

Beginning with the Johnson administration, the activities of radio propaganda against Cuba began to recede until new aggressive tendencies sprang up in the eighties conforming to the changes in strategy of U.S. foreign policy, under the Presidency of Reagan.

Various factors played a part in Johnson policy:

1. The repeated disasters of CIA schemes against Cuba

2. The consolidation of the Cuban Revolution in political terms and in matters of national security

3. The military presence in Indochina, acquiring a strategic dimension for the U.S.. Vietnam becomes the scenario in the next few years of the greatest military disasters experienced by the U.S. Armed Forces in its entire history

In a report presented by the Ministry of the Interior in a Seminar on Ideological Diversionism, 1974 (pp.29), it is stated: “As part of this process, a reorganisation of stations takes place: Swan Radio is closed down; two official programmes remain, “Date with Cuba” on the Voice of the United States and “Sunday News Radio” on Radio New York, these being basically ideological programmes, taking the position of “objective information,” abandoning the aggressive and flimsy arguments of previous years. “The clandestine radio stations appear occasionally and generally coincide with some subversive activity being carried out.” (...) ”One example of this new trend is seen in the “New Wave Show” on Radio America, created in 1967, which encouraged the Cuban youth to organize clubs, suggesting extravagant names to them."

Coinciding with this type of programming, a surge in youth groups and areas of concentrations of young people with anti-social tendencies was seen, under the influence of enemy activities.”

At the close of the Carter administration, substantial changes are being made in U.S. policy towards Cuba: one of its main trends is promoting subversive propaganda in order to destroy the Revolution from within and without

Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar became the dictator of Cuba in 1952. The United States had been kind to Batista. Shortly after, Fidel Castro, became the leader of an underground antigovernment group. After leading several failed uprisings, and being arrested for leading those revolts, Castro finally lead a successful rebellion against Batista. In 1959, Castro became the Premier.

At first, Castro was very conservative, but after he realized how much power he had gained, he started abusing it, being very hostile to both the Cuban people, and the United States. The United States, who had been very good to Cuba, but the U.S. started to get angry when, in 1960, Castro seized American oil refineries, sugar mills, and electric utilities. In the early 60s, he also started to welcome communism and formed close ties with the USSR.

In 1959, when Castro became premier, the Central Intelligence Agency, (CIA) started planning an invasion near Guantánamo Bay, a US naval base in Cuba, in the Bay of Pigs, in southern Cuba. The CIA set up a small sub-organization with the sole purpose of planning the invasion. Despite the propaganda, intelligence planning, counterintelligence planning, and paramilitary planning, the mission still failed.

In February 1962, the Inspector General wrote a document called "The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation." This was deemed top secret until 1997. Inside it tells many reasons for the failure. Why didn't the CIA think of these problems ahead of time?

Before Castro's reign over Cuba, a man named Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar was the Premier from 1952 to 1959. Castro was against Batista's ideas, so he joined an underground anti-Batista group. Fidel Castro went up through the ranks of the group, until he was the leader. He led several rebellions, and was arrested for them. Seven years later, he led a rebellion that was successful, and overthrew the Batista administration. Since he was the leader of the group, he became the new dictator of Cuba.

At First, he was a very conservative dictator. He was liked by the Cuban people, and by other countries, including the United States of America. This did not last long, when he soon realized how much power he had. He immediately seized American-owned properties in Cuba. This made him lose the United States as an ally.

However, Khruschev's United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), stayed as an ally, and influenced Castro to gradually change Cuba in to a communist state. This also scared the Pentagon, because a communist country not far from the coast of Florida was created.

Shortly afterward, a United States U-2 spy plane was shot down over Sverdlovsk, Russia. The pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was taken hostage by the United Soviet Socialist Republic, and interrogated. After the U-2 crash, Nikita Khruschev used the incident to sabotage the summit, the meeting between the leaders of United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the United Soviet Socialist Republic, which began in Paris.

The United States had to come up with an excuse, so the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) issued a statement saying that the plane was on a joint United States Air Force (USAF), and National Aeronautical and Space Administration mission. This mission was observing weather patterns around Lake Van, Turkey on May 1, 1960.

Before the famous U-2 spy plane incident in 1960, there was one in 1958, involving the United States and the United Soviet Socialist Republic. Ambassador Menshikov handed a memo to Secretary of State Alan Dulles saying that the United States violated Soviet Air space. It claimed (in its English form, it was written in Russian) "According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement of Velikaya Kema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time. Thereafter, the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan, in the area south of the Olga Bay."1 Secretary of State Alan Dulles replied, "The President read the Soviet aide-memoire which had been delivered to us yesterday protesting an alleged invasion of Soviet Airspace in the Far East on March 2. The President indicated a strong view that such infractions should be discontinued. He thought we should reply to the Soviets by saying we are not aware of the matter referred to but that strong measures were being taken to prevent any reoccurrence.

"The President expressed the view that any such operations carried a danger of starting a nuclear war by miscalculation. He said that his military advisors had pressed upon him the necessity of retaliation of there seemed to be a movement of Soviet planes toward the United States. The President felt that the Soviets might have the same attitude and might misinterpret an overflight as being designed to start a nuclear war against which they would react. "The President instructed General Goodpaster to communicate with the appropriate US officials in this sense."1

On April 21, 1958, a messenger working for the Soviet Embassy to the United States of America delivered a note to the United States Government. This note said that the response of the United States was unsatisfactory, and also said that the Soviets expected that the United States would court-martial, and hopefully punish the guilty of the violation of the Soviet airspace.

This was the airspace violation that happened the first time, before the major U-2 incident. The had many things in common, both over the USSR, both with U-2 planes, but, the first one was before Cuba became a communist state, because the Castro regime was yet to overthrow the Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar administration. This change in government would occur in one year.

The 1960 U-2 spy plane incident there was more at risk, because the Soviets had allied with Cuba, just ninety miles off the coast Florida. If the Soviets believed that the Americans wanted to start a nuclear war, like the Americans feared that the Soviets believed, the Soviets could perform an air strike on Florida, or possibly even on Washington, D.C. This was a possibility because Khruschev referred to the incident to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, as an "aggressive act." 1

In a telegram sent from Moscow to the United States Department of State, sent at 7:00pm Moscow time and received at 1:34pm Washington, D.C. This stated that the Soviets did not know at that time under what article of the United Nations Charter they would bring the plane incident before the United Nations Security Council, because they were still questioning Francis Gary Powers. Powers was the pilot, who parachuted out of the plane before it was shot down and landed safely, but under captivity of the Soviets.

Khruschev later told the Supreme Soviet in Moscow that Powers was alive and that the USSR Government had recovered parts of the plane, along with developed film that the camera on-board the airplane took. Also, as a result of the interrogation of Francis Powers, Khruschev said in his speech to the Supreme Soviet that Powers' route was from Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, and his landing destination was Bodo airfield in Norway.

"In response to the speech, the Department of State issued a statement on May 7 admitting that while the inquiry ordered by the President established that 'insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khruschev,' such a flight over the Soviet Union to gather information was probably undertaken, and it justified such activities necessary 'given the state of the world today' and that the Soviet Government's rejection of the President's 'open skies' proposal in 1955."1

On May 10, the United States Embassy in Moscow sent a note to the Soviet Government requesting permission to interview Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the U2 plane. "On the same day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivered a note to the Embassy replying to the U.S. note of May 6. The Soviet note protested 'aggressive acts of American aviation' and warned that 'if similar provocations are repeated, it will be obliged to take retaliatory measures."1 President Eisenhower decided, in response to this note from the Soviet Government, to cut off all activities that the Soviet Government may view as provocative.

Eisenhower left for the summit conference by plane on May 14, 1960, and arrived in Paris on May 15, 1960. President Charles de Gaulle received a copy of France from Nikita Khruschev of the United Soviet Socialist Republic, demanding that President Eisenhower denounce all U-2 flights over the Soviet Union as provocative, and also demanded that Eisenhower renounced all U-2 flights over the Soviet Union all together. Eisenhower agreed with Khruschev and announced that there would be no more U-2 flights over the USSR in his administration.

That was not enough for the Soviets. On May 18, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko asked the United Nations Security Council to consider the question of "aggressive acts by the United States Air Force against the Soviet Union, creating a threat to universal peace."1

Francis Gary Powers was tried, and later convicted of espionage by the Military Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

Fidel Castro, in order to create tension with the United States of America, seized all American-owned properties. Castro seized American oil refineries, sugar mills, and electric utilities. If the United States Government wasn't mad enough from the United Soviet Socialist Republic/United States U-2 Spy Plane Affair, Castro's actions made the United States Government even angrier.

On April 18, 1961, Two messages were sent, one from Premier Khruschev to President Kennedy, the other is the reply from Kennedy to Khruschev. Both were about the attempted Bay of Pigs Invasion, not long before the time these messages were written. These were published in the New York Times, on April 19, 1961.

"Mr. President, I address this message to you at an hour of anxiety fraught with danger to world peace. An armed aggression has begun against Cuba,"4 began Khruschev's letter. He wrote in this letter that he knew that the Cuban exiles that invaded Cuba were trained in the United States. Nikita Khruschev also wrote that he knew that the United States of America owned the planes that bombed Cuba. "Once recently we (The United Soviet Socialist Republic, and the United States of America) exchanged views through our representatives. We spoke about the common desire of both sides to make joint efforts to improve relations between our countries and avert the danger of war.

"Your statement of a few days ago to the effect that the United States would not take part in military operations against Cuba produced the impression that the top echelons of the United States are aware of the consequences of aggression against Cuba to world peace and to the United States itself.

"How are we to understand what is really being done by the United States now that the attack on Cuba has become a fact?" Nikita Khruschev wrote this to President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs Invasion. In my opinion, Khruschev wrote this to President John F. Kennedy to make him feel guilty, and try to patch up American/Soviet Relations. I believe this is why Nikita Khruschev wrote this letter to President John F. Kennedy, and my theory is also capable of being the right answer because later in the letter, Khruschev writes, "I earnestly appeal to you, Mr. President, to call a halt to the aggression against the Republic of Cuba. The military techniques and the world political situation are now such that any so-called 'small war' can produce a chain reaction in all parts of the world.

"As to the Soviet Union, there should be no misunderstanding of our position: we shall render the Cuban people and their Government all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack on Cuba.

"We are sincerely interested, in a relaxation of international tension, but if others aggravate it, we shall reply in full measure. And, in general, it is hardly possible to handle matters in such a way as to settle the situation and distinguish the conflagration in one area and kindle a new conflagration in another.

"I hope the United States Government will take into account these considerations of ours, prompted as they are by the sole concern for preventing such steps which could lead the world to a military catastrophe."

Khruschev in the previous paragraphs is trying to threaten the United States, almost as if the United Soviet Socialist Republic was a bully beating up and threatening the United States, using peer pressure, for beating up a friend of the United Soviet Socialist Republic's, Cuba. This appears in several places in Khruschev's letter. This appears the most blatantly in the last paragraph, "I hope that the United States Government will take into account these considerations of ours, prompted as they are by the sole considerations of ours, prompted as they are by the sole concern for preventing such steps which could lead the world to a military catastrophe." Here, the "military catastrophe" represents a schoolyard brawl.

Another example of this metaphor is in the paragraph, "I earnestly appeal to you, Mr. President, to call a halt to the aggression against the Republic of Cuba. The military techniques and the world political situation now are such that any so-called 'small-war' can produce a chain reaction in all parts of the world." Here the symbolism states that if a small fight between the United States of America, and the United Soviet Socialist Republic were to occur, other kids in the schoolyard, or countries in this case, would help out the bully, the United Soviet Socialist Republic, fight against the little weakling, the United States of America.

However, the bully, the United Soviet Socialist Republic, is giving the United States of America a chance to avoid a fight. "It is yet not too late to prevent the irreparable. The Government of the United States still can prevent the flames of war kindled by the interventionists on Cuba from spreading into a conflagration which it will be impossible to cope with." Here, the bully is giving the United States a chance to avoid the fight. The "flames of war kindled by the interventionists" is actually according to the symbolism, the fight that was started because the United States won't intervene between Cuban-Soviet relations.

The paragraph says "the flames of war kindled by the interventionists on Cuba from spreading into a conflagration which it will be impossible to cope with." The fact that they say it will be "impossible to cope with" means that the bully will torment the underdog every single day, until the United States finally surrenders.

"We are sincerely interested in a relaxation of international tension, but if others aggravate it, we shall reply in full measure. And in general, it is hardly possible to handle matters in such a way as to settle the situation and distinguish the conflagration in one area and kindle a new conflagration in another." This is the bully's way of telling the underdog that if anyone helps out the United States of America then the United Soviet Socialist Republic will ignite its rage against the underdog, and have a very brutal fight.

President John F. Kennedy wrote back to Premier Nikita Khruschev. "Mr. Chairman: You are under a serious misapprehension in regard to events in Cuba. For months there has been evident and growing resistance to the Castro dictatorship.

"More than 100,000 refugees have recently fled from Cuba into neighboring countries. Their urgent hope is naturally to assist their fellow Cubans in their struggle for freedom. Many of these refugees fought alongside Dr. Castro against the Batista dictatorship; among them are prominent leaders of his own original movement and government.

"These are unmistakable signs that Cubans found intolerable the denial of democratic liberties and the subversion of the 26 of July Movement by an alien-dominated regime. It cannot be surprising that, as resistance within Cuba grows, refugees have been using whatever means are available to return and support their countrymen in the continuing struggle for freedom. Where people are denied the right of choice, recourse to such struggle is only the means of achieving their liberties.

"I have previously stated and I repeat now that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba. In the event of any military intervention by an outside force we will immediately honor our obligations under the inter-American system to protect this hemisphere against external aggression.

"While refraining from military intervention in Cuba, the people of the United States do not conceal their admiration for Cuban patriots who wish to see a democratic system in an independent Cuba. The United States Government can take to action to stifle the spirit of liberty.

"I have taken careful note of your statement that the events in Cuba might affect peace in all parts of the world. I trust that this does not mean that the Soviet Government, using the situation in Cuba as a pretext, is planning to inflame other areas of the world. I would like to think that your Government has too great a sense of responsibility to embark upon any enterprise so dangerous to general peace.

"I agree with you as to the desirability of steps to improve the international atmosphere. I continue to hope that you will cooperate in opportunities now available to this end.

"A prompt cease-fire and peaceful settlement of the dangerous situation in Laos, cooperation from the United Nations in the Congo and a speedy conclusion of an acceptable treaty for the banning of nuclear tests would be constructive steps in this direction.

"The regime in Cuba could make a similar contribution by permitting the Cuban people freely to determine their own future by democratic processes and freely to cooperate with their Latin-American neighbors.

"I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you should recognize that free peoples in all parts of the world do not accept the claim of historical inevitability for Communist revolution.

"What your Government believes is its own business; what it does in the world is the world's business. The great revolution in this history of man, past, present, and future, is the revolution of those determined to be free."

This reply also carries the same theme in its symbolism. This is the attempted comeback of the underdog to the bully. This is particularly obvious in the paragraph, "While refraining from military intervention in Cuba, the people of the United States do not conceal their admiration for Cuban patriots who wish to see a democratic system in an independent Cuba. The United States Government can take no action to stifle the spirit of liberty." This paragraph symbolizes the underdog, the United States of America is trying to stand strong and say that Cuba's citizens want to come to the United States of America and change their government to democratic like the United States', but then, the United States tries to not insult the bully by saying at the end of the letter, "What your Government does is its own business." But, then again, to stand strong, the United States replies, "what it does in the world is the world's business", but is does not necessarily say it is the United States' business.

Castro/Khruschev relations are very good, as obvious above, but Khruschev and his United Soviet Socialist Republic were shielding the Republic of Cuba, partially because it had no defense, and strategically, it was a very valuable place, just ninety miles of the coast of Florida, in the United States of America. Although, the letters above were written just afterward the Bay of Pigs Invasion, and later, Khruschev will use Cuba to his advantage, and setup nuclear weapons on the small island. Needless to say, this was a very valuable island to Khruschev.

On February 21st, 1998, The New York Times reported that the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation was released under the Freedom of Information Act to the National Security Archives, a non-profit group that collects and publishes declassified Government documents. Inside the article, it quoted several paragraphs of The Inspector Generals Survey of the Cuban Operation.

The Inspector Generals Survey of the Cuban Operation was the internal document inside the Central Intelligence Agency explaining the failure. The document was written by the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, and was kept in his files in the Agency's building in Washington. It was released under the Freedom of Information Act on February 21st, 1998, to an organization on the World Wide Web called the National Security Archives. This organization is a non-profit organization that through its web page gives the public, such as myself, Government documents, some of which, used to have been top secret.

As it says in the introduction of this document, "This is the Inspector General's report on the Central Intelligence Agency's ill-fated attempt to implement national policy by overthrowing the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba by means of a covert paramilitary operation."2 It also says that the purpose of this document is "to describe weaknesses and failures disclosed by the study, and to make recommendations for their correction and avoidance in the future…It does not describe or analyze in detail the purely military phase of the effort…In preparing the survey the Inspector General and his representatives interviewed about 125 Agency employees of all levels and studied a large quantity of documentary material."2

The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation states that President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the following by approving a paper entitled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime":

"a. Formation of a Cuban exile organization to attract Cuban loyalties, to direct opposition activities, and to provide cover for Agency operations.

b. A propaganda offensive in the name of the opposition.

c. Creation inside Cuba of a clandestine intelligence collection and action apparatus to be responsive to the direction of the exile organization

d. Development outside Cuba of a small paramilitary force to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance groups."

The concept was for the Cuban exile council to serve as cover for the United States Government by acting as a group of American businessmen. When the United States Government went along to plan and doing actions making the actions themselves publicly known, but since there was cover, "the hand of the U.S. Government would not appear"2 because of the Cuban exile group, which would later form a group called FRD.

This document states that the reason for invasion of Cuba by the United States of America was a way to stop communism from spreading to the Western Hemisphere, near the United States, a world power and a Democracy. The United States Government felt it was a danger to National Security, which eventually it was during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The history of the Bay of Pigs, or for now the Cuban Operation, began in 1959, shortly after Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar was overthrown by Fidel Castro. The Central Intelligence Agency needed a way to accomplish a second revolution in Cuba, this time a Democratic revolution. The Central Intelligence Agency developed a Branch of the Western Hemisphere Division, a division of the Central Intelligence Agency, which handled Intelligence efforts on the Western Hemisphere of the earth. This branch was named Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four, or WH/4 as an abbreviation.

WH/4 was an expandable task force in charge of the Cuban Operation, and involved in the all the aspects as mentioned in the previous list on page 14. Each aspect of the operation had a different are to work from. The recruiting center for the Cuban Exile group was in Miami, with a second on in Cuba. The propaganda aspect was located in several different areas across the continent. For example, there was one powerful "gray" radio station in Massachusetts, there was another radio station posing as a legitimate commercial station on Swan Island. A television show in Spanish was created in Miami, and several written publications were created including a newspaper named Avance, and even an Anti-Castro comic book!

Inside Cuba a clandestine intelligence group was created with the sole purpose of being responsive to the Cuban exile group. Out side Cuba there was a small paramilitary group with the plan to enter Cuba when deemed necessary to organize, train, and lead resistance groups.

The Central Intelligence Agency decided they needed to capture the island to save the United States of America from attacks by Communist nations. This plan was known as The Bay of Pigs. In the internal CIA document, "The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation", the Inspector General refers to the mission as "the Central Intelligence Agency's ill-fated attempt to implement national policy by overthrowing the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba by means of a covert paramilitary operation."2

The actual Bay of Pigs Invasion begins in the year 1959, and ends with the Cuban victory on April 19, 1961. The Invasion became official on March 17, 1960, when President Eisenhower authored a paper titled, "A Program of Covert Action Agency Against the Castro Regime". This authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake the following:

"a. Formation of a Cuban exile organization to attract Cuban loyalties, to direct opposition activities, and to provide cover for Agency operations.

b. A propaganda offensive in the name of the opposition.

c. Creation inside Cuba of a clandestine intelligence collection and action apparatus to be responsive to the direction of the exile organization.

d. Development outside Cuba of a small paramilitary force to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train, and lead resistance groups."2

Eisenhower also approved the budget for the operation, which totaled

$4, 400,000. This included "Political action, $950,000; propaganda, $1,700,000; paramilitary, $1,500,000; intelligence collection, $250,000."2

The plan was to train Cuban exiles, which would serve as a cover for action by the Central Intelligence Agency, which became known by the public. All Central Intelligence Agency personnel that had any contact with the Cuban public would have a separate identity as an American businessman. This would hide all United States Government involvement.

In August 1959, the Chief of the Paramilitary Group attended a meeting to discuss the creation of a paramilitary group, to be used in Latin American crisis situations. He setup a small, proprietary airline for future use. At this time, Cuba was only one of may possible targets.

On January 18, 1960, the Western Hemisphere Division (WH) of the Central Intelligence Agency created a sub-division, Branch 4, (WH/4). WH/4 was an expandable task force to run the Cuban Operation. At this time, Western Hemisphere Division, Branch four was looking for office space, warehouses, recruiting and training centers, safe sites, a communications center, and bases in the Miami, Florida area. This property would be used for the movement of persons, material, and propaganda, into or out of Cuba. At the same time, the Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four was negotiating for a training site in Panama.

The Bay of Pigs operation starts in 1959, however, "Formal U.S. Government adoption of the project occurred on 17 March 1960, when, after preliminary preparations by the agency, President Eisenhower approved an Agency paper titled 'A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime' and thereby authorized the Agency to undertake this program."2 Several sub-programs were set up. The propaganda team was set up to release propaganda offensive of the Castro administration. The US government also recruited Cuban exiles, to set up an organization to "attract Cuban Loyalties, to direct opposition, and to provide cover for Agency operations 2 The government also set up a clandestine intelligence organization to work alongside the Cuban exile organization. Outside Cuba, the government set up a "small paramilitary force to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train, and lead resistance groups.

"The Cuban exile council would serve as cover for action which became publicly known. Agency personnel in contact with Cuban exiles would be documented as representatives of a group of private American businessmen. The hand of the U.S. government would not appear.2" This was the plan for the Invasion, that did not accomplish its goal, instead embarrassed the Kennedy Administration.

"In 1959, the Chief of the Agency's Paramilitary Group attended a meeting [Blacked out] to discuss the creation of a paramilitary capability to be used in Latin America Crisis situations."2 Cuba was considered a crisis situation in Latin America. Cuba, however, was only one of many possible targets. The chief of the Paramilitary Group began a group of staff studies for the WH (Western Hemisphere Division.) The WH setup the paramilitary staff. The chief also setup a small airline for future use. In January 1960, the WH setup WH/4, an expandable sub-division to run the operation. The initial WH/4 consisted of forty people. Eighteen were at the WH/4 Headquarters, twenty at Havana Station, and two at the Santiago Base.

WH/4 negotiated for a training center in Panama. The officers searched Miami, Florida, for office space, warehouses, safe sites, recruiting centers, a communications center, and bases for "the movement of persons, materiel, and propaganda into or out of Cuba."2

The CIA WH/4 division started to setup radio outlets in Massachusetts, and two others that were blacked out in the "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation". The division also worked out that a powerful "gray" station on Swan Island, could be setup in two months. Another propaganda operation besides the radio station was setup after the CIA confiscated a Cuban Newspaper, and arranged for a special propaganda anti-Castro edition to be published.

"In the last months of 1959 the Special Group, composed of representatives of several departments and agencies and charged by NSC 5412 with responsibility for policy approval of major covert operations, considered several agency proposals for exile broadcasts to Cuba. During January and February of 1960 the Director of Central Intelligence informed the Special Group of Agency planning with regard to Cuba, and on 14 March an entire meeting was devoted to discussion of the Agency's Program."2

"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is reported to have said that forces totaling 50,000 men were ready if needed and that the first of them could be ready within four hours after receipt of orders." 2

One problem may have been that the Central Intelligence Agency did not pay enough attention to the operation, thus not giving it the time it deserved, thus, making it perfectly clear why the operation failed, right? Wrong. Section B, Paragraph 15 of the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation clearly states, "The project to unseat Castro had become a major Agency activity with the highest policy sanction, engaging the full-time activity of the personnel of a rapidly expanding operation in higher Agency echelons and entailing frequent liaison with other agencies and departments of the Government."2

"Late September 1960 saw almost simultaneous occurrence of the first maritime operation and the first air drop over Cuba. The former was successful. The latter, the first of a series of failures, resulted in the capture and execution of a paramilitary agent on whom the project had set a great store."2

There were more successful maritime operations; most of them took place in late 1960, before severe winter weather began to make them almost impossible. Another problem was that the project only had one boat regularly available during this time, and creating a resistance in a clandestine fashion with only one boat takes a very long time. This sense of impossibility was increased when word got to the division that Castro's army was strengthened with thirty to forty thousand tons of Bloc arms, and the fact that Cuban Government internal security was being heightened. The sense of impossibility, however, wore off when the Nicaraguan Government offered the Central Intelligence Agency Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four an airstrip and docking facilities. This brought the United States 250 miles closer to Cuba from Guatemala.

Why did the operation fail? The problem may have been financial. "The Activities described to the President continued at an accelerated rate, but the financial approach was relatively cautious in the early weeks.

"Propaganda activity had gotten off to an early start and had developed rapidly. After an initial shakedown period Radio Swan had gone on the air first with anti-Trujillo, then with ant-Castro broadcasts. Radio programs were also originating from Miami and [Blacked out]. The newspaper Avance in Exile was being published by the end of the summer, and a second paper and a weekly magazine were planned…

"By the end of August the FRD had a lawyer team set for a Latin American propaganda tour and was ready with its first broadcast on Radio Swan, which was reported to be getting world-wide reception with many listeners in Cuba. An anti-Castro comic book was being reprinted, and a Spanish-language television program was being prepared in Miami.

"At the end of August WH/4 Branch was reporting that a machine run search had failed to find any bilingual Agency employee suitable as a Radio Swan announcer. (This search went on for some time. On 28 December the branch reported finding a candidate, but an 18 January 1961 that he had backed out.)" 2 On November 29th 1960 President Eisenhower gave a general go-ahead signal to the Western Hemisphere Division of the Central Intelligence Agency and reaffirmed it on January 3rd, 1961, but turned it down shortly afterward. This caused the cancellation of a proposed propaganda drop.

There were some financial problems with Radio Swan. To publicize it, which served a double purpose to enhance its cover as a legitimate commercial radio station, it needed to advertise.

Bohemia Libre, weekly propaganda magazine, was budgeted at $300,000 but it actually cost about $35,000 an issue. It did not do well, because it had bad luck selling advertising, and even missed an issue because it could not sell enough advertising to produce the magazine, for that week. Additional funding had been requested several times. However, despite the hardships it went through, its circulation was 126,000, second to Reader's Digest in the Spanish-Language field.

Propaganda played a major role in the Bay of Pigs Operation. The exile periodical Avance, whose plant in Havana was seized by Castro, was being prepared. The Government purchased a boat for anti-Castro marine broadcasts, and the Swan Island radio station, was on the air with test signals by May 17th.

The budget for the operation was estimated at $4, 400, 000. $950,000 was assigned for political action, the propaganda division received $1,700,000; paramilitary received $1,500,000; and finally the last $250,000 went toward intelligence collection.

The Agency did not stick to their plan budget-wise. On July 1st, 1960, The Western Hemisphere Division of the Central Intelligence Agency estimated costs for the next four weeks at $1,700,000 and for the fiscal year they estimated $25,000,000. On August 19th the Western Hemisphere Division requested an additional $10,000,000 and all $10,000,000 was obtained!

On November 4th, 1960, WH/4 decided to change the focus of the operation by expanding the paramilitary unit and running the operation on more conventional military lines. This caused recruiting efforts to be increased at the Guatemala base where 475 trainees were stationed. The breakdown was 101 air trainees, 370 paramilitary trainees, and six specialists that included doctors, dentists, and chaplains. After a long chain of events, this lead to WH/4 needing more funding. Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four reported it only had $2,250,000 left in the fiscal year. Another estimate was given and the Bureau of the Budget granted WH/4 another $28,200,000.

That was the large scale, but there were, however, financial problems on a smaller scale. To publicize Radio Swan, and to enhance its cover, the radio station took out ads in local newspapers. In the next few weeks, Radio Swan received a total of $330 in gifts.

On 24 March 1960 the project was approved by the director of Central Intelligence in the initial amount of $900,000 for the rest of Fiscal Year 1960. However, only two weeks later, on 7 April, WH/4 Branch reported that 85% of the $900,000 had been obligated. By 30 June an additional $1,000,000 was obligated. "2

This money was needed, for Western Hemisphere Division Brach Four grew considerably from January 1960, when it had just forty employees, to April 16, 1961, when it became one of the largest branches in the Clandestine Services division, with 588 employees. This statistic does not include the air operations personnel, because they worked for the Development Projects Division (DPD), which was a lot of people.

Earlier in the document, the Inspector General wrote about a group of agents posing as American businessmen. Now, it goes in to more detail. These project political action officers; created a group known as Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD) was agreed upon on May 11, 1960.

Propaganda played a major role in the Bay of Pigs Operation. The exile periodical Avance, whose plant in Havana was seized by Castro, was being prepared. The Government purchased a boat for anti-Castro marine broadcasts, and the Swan Island radio station, was on the air with test signals by May 17th.

Propaganda was not the only aspect developing at this time. $25,000 worth of sterile arms was sent to the Panama training base, which had been open since May 11th. A Miami Base was opened May 25th in the Coral Gables business district under the cover of a New York career development and placement firm, and was backed up by a Department of Defense contract. On June 15th, a communications site with military cover, was setup at the former Richmond Naval Air Station, which was being leased by the University of Miami. Safe houses were also purchased in the Miami area.

By June, the American press was beginning to "nibble" at the operation, especially Radio Swan, the Swan Island radio station, implying that it was not completely legitimate.

In July 1960, the air training program got underway when the Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four began screening Cuban recruits to be pilots, and negotiating with the Defense Department for twelve AD-5s and the Navy for seventy-five instructors and maintenance personnel. By mid June, twenty-nine Cuban Exiles had arrived at the Panama training facility to begin training in small-unit infiltration.

In August 1960, the President was briefed with the following briefing paper: "The initial phase of paramilitary operations envisages the development, support and guidance of dissident groups in three areas of Cuba: Piper del Rio, Escambray and Sierra Maestra. These groups will be organized for concerted guerilla action against the regime.

"The second phase will be initiated by combined sea-air assault by FRD forces on the Isle of Pines coordinated with general guerilla activity on the main island of Cuba. This will establish a close-in staging base for future operations.

"The last phase will be air assault on the Havana area with the guerilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground from these areas into the Havana area also."2

The finance aspect was running off schedule, much farther away from the original estimates. The Western Hemisphere Division estimated operating expenses for four weeks, beginning July 1st at $1,700,00, and approximately $25,000,000 for the fiscal year. On August 19th the Division added an additional $10,000,000, and was received. Half of the total $35 Million was for paramilitary expenses and about two million dollars was for propaganda.

Anti-Castro Regime Propaganda broadcasts and newspapers had taken off early and developed quickly. Besides from Radio Swan, there were also anti-Castro radio shows originating from Miami and from another undisclosed location. By the end of the summer, Avance in Exile, the propaganda newspaper, was being published, and two more were being planned. An anti-Castro television program in Spanish was being prepared in Miami, and even an ant-Castro comic book was being printed.

A computer-ran search for a bilingual Western Hemisphere Division employee capable of being a radio-swan announcer had failed to find one. However, on December 28th, it found one, but he backed out January 18th 1961. The computer did not find another match.

During the Bay of Pigs Invasion, there were many problems with the actual plan, and this is what caused the failure. Frankly, I feel that this plan was very good, and don't know where the fatal mistake was if I hadn't read about it, because it wasn't very obvious. The Inspector General suggested these conclusions on page 143 of the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation:

"1.The Central Intelligence Agency, after starting to build up the resistance and guerilla forces inside Cuba, drastically concerted the project into what rapidly became an overt military operation. The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.

"2.The Agency became so wrapped up in the military operation that it failed to appraise the [blurred] of [blurred] realistically. Furthermore, it failed to keep the national policy-makers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered essential for success, and it did not [burred] sufficiently for prompt policy decisions in a fast moving situation.

"3.As the project grew, the Agency reduced the exiled leaders to the status of puppets, thereby losing the advantages of their active participation.

"4.The Agency failed to build up and supply a resistance organization under rather favorable conditions. Air and boat operations showed up poorly.

"5. The Agency failed to collect adequate information on the strengths of the Castro regime and the extent of the opposition to it; and it failed to evaluate the available information correctly.

"6.The project was badly organized. Command lines and [blurred] controls were ineffective and useless. Senior Staffs if the Agency were not utilized; air support stayed independent of the project; the role of the large forward [blurred] was not clear.

"7.The project was not staffed with top-quality people, and a number of people were not used to the best advantage.

"8. The Agency entered the project without adequate [blurred] in the way of [blurred], bases, training facilities, [blurred][blurred], Spanish-speakers, and similar essential ingredients of a successful operation. [Blurred] these been already in being, such time and effort would have been saved."2

In the weeks before the actual invasion, the Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four hastened their pace in the preparations. On March 12th, 1961 the LCI "Barbara J" launched and recovered a sabotage team against the Texaco refinery in Santiago, Cuba. Beginning on March 13th, and ending on March 15th, the project chiefs worked on a revised plan that they presented to the President on March 15th.

Although the planning was going along smoothly, it was taking to long for the Cuban exiles to wait, and several went AWOL. "In late March the [blacked out] ostensible owner of the Swan Island radio station, thanked all the sponsored of political programs and advised them that no more tapes would be required; purpose of this action was to clear the way for a unity program during the action phase of the operation."2 Although the mission was being prepared and almost ready, the Guatemala Camp was accepting trainees as late as the week of April 4th.

Flights over Cuba were suspended on March 28th. The Government gave two reasons for the suspension. "(a) That the aircraft were needed to move the strike force from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, for embarkation on the invasion ships; (b) that the Agency wished to avoid any incident, such as a plane being downed over Cuba, which might upset the course of events during the critical pre-invasion period."2

Three Cuban airfields were raided by eight B-26s on April 15th, and resulted in destroying about half of Castro's air force, which was estimated by post-strike photography.

Attacks were not the only aspect of the invasion that was increasing. Propaganda efforts were increased. Before D-Day, Radio Swan as well as other propaganda outlets were broadcasting eighteen hours a day on medium wave, and sixteen hours a day on short wave. "Immediately after D-Day, these totals were increased to 55 hours and 26 hours, receptively. Fourteen frequencies were used. By the time of the invasion a total of 12,000,000 pounds of leaflets had been dropped on Cuba." 2

Late on April 16th, the eve of D-Day, the air strikes planned to destroy the rest of Castro's air force were called off.

"The invasion fleet which had assembled off the south coast of Cuba on the night of 16 April included two LCIs owned by the Agency, a U.S. Navy LSD carrying three LCUs and four LCVPs, all of them pre-loaded with supplies, and even charted commercial freighters. All these craft participated in the assault phase, except for three freighters which were loaded with follow-up supplies for ground and air-forces. These vessels were armed with 50-caliber machine guns. In addition, each LCI mounted two 75-mm. Recoilless rifles.

"In addition to the personal weapons of the Cuban exile soldiers, the armament provided for combat included sufficient numbers of Browning automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and flame-throwers. There were also five M-41 tanks, 12 heavy trucks, an aviation fuel tank truck, a tractor crane, a bulldozer, two large water trailers, and numerous small trucks and tractors." 2

A total of 1,511 men fought in the invasion, all of them were on the invasion ships, except for one airborne infantry company comprised of 177 men. The entire brigade included five infantry companies, one heavy weapons company, on intelligence-reconnaissance company, and one tank platoon.

"These troops had been moved by air on three successive nights from the Guatemala training camp to the staging area in Nicaragua where they embarked in the ships which had been pre-loaded at New Orleans. The ships had moved on separate courses from Nicaragua, under unobtrusive Navy escort, to the rendezvous 40 miles offshore in order to avoid the appearance of a convoy. From there they had moved in a column under cover of darkness to a point 5,000 yards to the landing area, where they met the Navy LSD. These complicated movements were apparently accomplished in a secure manner and without alerting the enemy." 2

Three follow-up ships were scheduled to arrive in Cuba, one from Nicaragua was supposed to come

Inside the March 23rd 1998 issue of Newsweek, the cover story was called "The Bay of Pigs Redux". "The Bay of Pigs Redux" was a story about a plan that the Central Intelligence Agency conceived of, that was strikingly similar to the Bay of Pigs Invasion Plan, except it was to overthrow Saddam Hussein, instead of Fidel Castro.

The article's writers, Christopher Dickey, Evan Thomas, and Gregory L. Vistica decided to not write anything about the real Bay of Pigs Invasion, just about the $20 Million operation that President Bush started after the end of the Persian Gulf War.

The Central Intelligence Agency sent a man whose code name was "Bob". "Bob" spoke fluent Arabic, and new how to wear a turban that looked right, so he blended right into Iraqi society. He came to Iraq January 1995, armed with an AK-47, a computer that he operated from his temporary home in Salah ad Din, Iraq, and knowing that Ahmed Chalabi, an MIT-trained banker that was convicted of embezzlement of tens of millions of dollars in a Jordanian court, was the operation head.

So far, everything sounds ok, right? So far it is. This is about to take a change for the worse, and become more and more like the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961. While he was there, "Bob" allied with Kurdish exiles because the Central Intelligence Agency had betrayed them in the past, and made arrangements for these exiles fight alongside the United States Government against Saddam Hussein. The Kurds were willing to fight Hussein because they were trying to build a homeland in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, and if they could defeat Iraq, they could receive some land. Does any of this sound familiar yet? It could be because this is exactly what happened at the beginning of the preparations for the Bay of Pigs Invasion, except it was with Cuban exiles instead of Kurdish exiles trying to build a homeland in the Middle East!

This all ended in 1996, when the Iraqis found out about the operation, they sent out a group of tanks that killed the resistance fighters. The tanks killed the fighters, and The United States Government gave word to stop the operation.

In conclusion, I think that the Inspector General Lymon Kirkpatrick was right when he said that the Central Intelligence Agency should have done more research on the Cubans' weaknesses and strengths before invading, so that the Central Intelligence Agency Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four could have possibly defeated the Fidel Castro regime of the Republic of Cuba. I think the United States should have also done more to help relations with the United Soviet Socialist Republic, because they may have helped out, since the Republic of Cuba was an ally, rather than fight the United States of America.

That was not the end of tense moments between Cuba and the United Soviet Socialist Republic and the United States of America. For exactly two weeks beginning on October 15, the Cuban Missile Crisis existed. On October 15, a U-2 spy plane piloted by Richard Heyser revealed SS-4 nuclear missiles in Cuba all aimed at various points in the United States. The missile silos were disguised as trees, or at least the communists tried to disguise them as trees.

On October 16, the next day, President John Fitzgerald Kennedy was informed of this sighting during breakfast. He called a meeting of EX-COMM, his twelve most important advisors. According to EX-COMM, Khruschev would retaliate no matter what action they took. Still, Kennedy called a blockade to begin at 10 am Eastern Daylight Time on October 24th 1962.

President John F. Kennedy was able to talk Khruschev into disabling the missiles on October 26th , but on October 27th, Khruschev demanded to renegotiate terms. On October 28th, 1962, Khruschev had agreed to remove all missiles from the Republic of Cuba.

In the next several years, the CIA still had a tense time with the USSR, and the Republic of Cuba. In the internal memo" Views of a Cuban Official on the future of Cuban-United States Relations, it says that the United States would be able to intervene without any consequences if the Vietnam War escalated and all the other powers concentrated on Vietnam, not Cuba.

In 1964, the Cuban exiles planned a March on Washington. The would begin in front of the Pan-American Union Building then march to the Lincoln Memorial where they would conduct a rally. This is described in Planned March on Washington by Cuban Exiles on 21 July 1964 at Start of OAS Sessions on the Cuban Problem.

As of March 1968, The USSR was still giving Cuba economic aid. This went on despite Castro's attacks on Soviet policies. If Soviet economic aid was cut-off, the Cuban economy was in such bad condition, it would cause an economic crisis in Cuba. This is described in Continued Soviet Economic Aid to Cuba and Public Soviet Attacks on Castro's Interference in Other Communist Parties.

The United States Policy was to isolate Cuba from the rest of the free world on December 12th, 1963. The United States' plan was to replace the Castro regime and replace it with an administration that would be fully compatible with the United States of America. "In the last analysis, however, there are only two courses which would eliminate the Castro regime at an early date: an invasion or a complete blockade. Both of the se actions would result in a major crisis between the US and the USSR (in Cuba and/or Berlin) and would produce substantial strains in the fabric of US relations with other countries-allied as well as neutral. To a greater extent than in any of the courses discussed above, OAS support would be important, if not critical, in reducing the risks and in increasing the practical and political effect of an invasion or a blockade."3 This is described in Document 24, Cuba-A Status Report.

Despite the embarrassment and the Cuban Missile Crisis that came later, I personally think that the United States Government should stop trying to destroy and spend millions of dollars trying to destroy Communism, and instead, learn to live with it.

I personally think Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick said it best in The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation when he wrote, "Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind that the possibility of an invasion was doomed in advance, that an initially successful landing by 1,500 men would eventually have been crushed by Castro's combined military resources strengthened by Soviet Bloc-supplied military materiel."

The United States organized, financed and
executed the invasion of Cuba in April 1961

• The Bay of Pigs invasion led to 176 Cuban deaths and over 300 wounded
• Documents declassified in the United States confirm the participation of the U.S.
government and the CIA in the plans of aggression against Cuba

THE mercenary Bay of Pigs invasion, in April 1961, left a count of 176 deaths, more than 300 wounded and 50 maimed for life, for which reason it constitutes Point Four of the Cuban people’s claim against the government of the United States.

"On March 17, 1960, I ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to begin to organize the training of Cuban exiles, principally in Guatemala."

The above words were stated by President Dwight Eisenhower and appear in recently declassified documents constituting authentic evidence of the participation of the U.S. government and the CIA in the organization and financing of covert plans to do away with the Cuban Revolution, presented to the court by witness Tomás Diez Acosta, a researcher at the Cuban History Institute.

Eisenhower was referring to the March 16, 1960, covert action program against the Castro regime and approved by him, with the warning that, in whatever circumstances, the CIA should be prepared to swear that the U.S. president knew absolutely nothing about it: "Our hand must not be seen in anything that is done."

But statements made by Diez Acosta, based on information contained in official volumes of U.S. government foreign policy and published by the State Department, as well as photocopies of other declassified documents, leave no room for doubt.

After a meeting with President Fidel Castro (who visited the United States in response to an invitation in April 1959), Richard Nixon, then vice president, dictated a memorandum in which he informed Eisenhower: "Castro is incredibly naive in relation to communism or is under its discipline. He should not be considered, falsely, as a frenzied rebel in the Bolívar style, for which reason one has to work accordingly."

Leaving aside the description given to Simón Bolívar, which is not relevant to this trial, "working accordingly" meant destroying the Revolution by building up opposition on the island. Richard Nixon admitted this in his book Six Crises. In December 1959, Colonel J. C. King, head of the CIA’s western hemisphere division, recommended in a report to the agency’s general director to "seriously consider Castro’s elimination."

The covert action program approved by Eisenhower consisted of four fundamental premises: to create a responsible, attractive and unified Cuban opposition; to develop a propaganda offensive in the name of the opposition via Radio Swan; to create a secret intelligence and action organization within the country that would respond to the Cuban opposition in exile; and to train an adequate military force outside of Cuba which would be infiltrated into the island and enjoy full logistical support.

The witness recounted how, by January 1960, the Western Hemisphere Division’s WH4 task force for covert warfare against Cuba, composed of 40 officers (18 in the central station and two in Santiago de Cuba), was in place.

By April 1961, when the Bay of Pigs mercenary invasion took place, the cost of its actions was in excess of $46 million USD, and a total of 588 officers were involved in them.

A few days after assuming the presidency in January 1961, John F. Kennedy met with the CIA leadership to receive information on the plans against Cuba and recommended that the Pentagon make an in-depth study of the program, which was later described as positive.

By April 6, the trained brigade’s strength was 1390 men.

Division General Samuel Rodiles Planas was another witness to appear before the court. In his statement, he testified that the equipment utilized in the invasion belonged to the U.S. army: warships, landing craft, Sherman tanks, artillery armored cars, 57- and 75-millimeter cannons and mortars, among others.

He also referred to the presence of U.S. National Guard pilots like Thomas Willard Ray, Frank Leo Baker, Ryley W. Shamburger and Wade Carroll Gray, crew members of two B-26 planes brought down by the revolutionary artillery.

Rodiles Planas additionally testified to the death of over 30 persons and over one hundred wounded among the police and militia 116 battalions.

Division General Néstor López Cuba, wounded at the front while leading the advance of the Cuban tanks, spoke of the death of many of his comrades and of others who were mutilated and burned by napalm.

Eva Rodríguez Córdoba, who was 16 when the invasion took place, moved everyone present in the courtroom. She told how mercenary planes, machine gunning the population, forced people to take cover in the hills, where she had to give birth without any other assistance than that of another Cuban woman who, crawling among the scrub, was looking for her son. Eva’s child was a blue baby and currently, aged 38, suffers from a mental disorder.

Another witness whose declarations confirmed CIA participation in the plans of aggressions and subversion against Cuba was Benigno Pérez Vivanco, who received military training from the agency in Guatemala and Panama, from 1960-61. In March 1961 he arrived in Cuba from Key West with the mission, alongside other infiltrators, of introducing 14 tons of arms destined for counterrevolutionary organizations. After being taken prisoner, Benigno cooperated with the state security forces.

To conceal its part in the invasion and confuse the revolutionary forces, the United States masked the fighter planes with the Cuban flag. Thus men like Israel López Pupo were initially taken in. He was hit by shrapnel over the right eye, which cost him his sight; as well as on his left hand, which subsequently had to be amputated. That strategic objective, which U.S. ambassador Adlai Stevenson lied about in the UN, was to try and convince the world that it was an internal rebellion by pilots from the Revolutionary Air Force.

After the military defeat at the Bay of Pigs, the U.S. government began to create the conditions for other actions. It had developed a strategy consisting of 32 concrete tasks, the objective of which was to prepare the conditions for internal subversion on the island; plus number 33, designed to incapacitate the sugarcane workers via chemical warfare, as witness Tomás Diez Acosta testified, consistently basing his evidence on U.S. declassified documents.

In addition, in response to a proposal by Robert Kennedy, then U.S. attorney general, Operation Mongoose, which contemplated infiltration, sabotage and acts of terrorism on the island, was drawn up and approved, with no expenses spared, according to Diez.

 

EYES ONLY SECRET

Brief History of Radio Swan

1. On 17 March 1960, President Eisenhower approved a covert action program to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime.  Within the propaganda framework of that program, an important objective was to create and utilize a high-powered medium and short wave radio station. CIA was asked to provide such a station, outside the continental limits of the United States, and have it ready for operation within sixty (60) days.

2. Swan Island, in the Caribbean, was chosen as an appropriate site. The United States Navy furnished CIA with splended support: within sixty days, equipment had been brought from [intentional blank], a landing strip was cleared on the island, and the station was able to go on air on 17 May of the same year, precisely on schedule.

3. Originally it was planned that Radio Swan would be a clandestine station [intentional blank]. Just prior to inauguration, however, it was decided the station should be a commercial one. This was at the request of the Navy, which reasonably argued that should their participation in construction of a black facility be known, explanations would be difficult.

4. Using a "commercial" station for the tactical and strategic tasks envisaged for Radio Swan is not, of course, the most desirable way to support a covert operation. The only pracitical method of operation is to "sell space". Thus, program time on Radio Swan was gold to various Cuban groups. These included organizations of workers, students, women, two publications in exile, two radio stations in exile, and several political groups. [intentional blank] Programs (on tape) were produced in [intentional blank] and later, on Swan Island.

5. Radio Swan effectively reached not only its target area of Cuba, but the entire Caribbean as well. Soon after broadcasts began Castro started jamming, but was sucessful in hindering reception only in the City of Havana. Scores of letters were received from all parts of Cuba to show that the station had listeners. As late as March 1961, a survey was made to determine the extent of listening coverage. An inexpensive ballpoint pen was offered to those listeners who would write in to the station. The reply was immediate: almost 3,000 letters from 26 countries. This barrage of mail included significant amounts from all parts of Cuba.

6. As Radio Swan progressed, it became the symbol of the anti-Castro effort within Cuba and of opposition to Castro throughout the hemisphere. Toward the end of 1960, the effectiveness of Radio Swan began to diminish. Although great numbers of Cubans still listened to the station, its credibility and reputation began to suffer as the result of statements representing the selfish interests of the Cuban groups producing the various programs. In the first place, these groups talked overmuch about their activities in Miami and the hard fight they were conducting along Biscayne Boulevard. Naturally, the Cubans who were suffering under the Castro dictatorship within Cuba resented this. Secondly, the Cuban programs became a fulcrum where individual political ambitions of Cuban exiles in Miami were presented to the other Cubans in Miami, forgetting the all-important target audience within Cuba. Finally, each program fought with the other for "scoops". As time passed and the Cubans found that their sources of information were no better than the next fellow's, the program producers began to exaggerate in order to give their broadcasts a touch of sensationalism. They made statements which were obvious lies to listeners. An example: One of their announcers stated that there were 3,000 Russians in a park in Santiago de Cuba -- the residents had only to walk to the park to see that this was untrue. Moreover, the various programs began to defy coordination. All programs but one told the Cuban militiaman that he would be a hero on the day that he defected from Castro. The sole exception told the Cuban militiaman that he would be hanged regardless of what he did. [intentional blank] This action failed to achieve proper control.

7. As this unfortunate situation developed, the military operation was about to be launched. It was obvious that CIA could not allow uncoordinated programming to continue while the station attempted to provide tactical support to military forces. On the 27th of March 1961 each program producer received a letter from the management of Radio Swan informing him of the termination of his program. Broadcasting was not suspended. Rather, it was immediately replaced with a new, overall programming schedule--more broadcasting hours than before [intentional blank] Thus Radio Swan was converted into a station which provided the Cuban people with straight news as well as a program which stated its only function was to assist those who were fighting Castro within Cuba. This was the beginning of an intensified propaganda campaign directed against Castro. Within a few days after the change, Radio Mambi, a Cuban government station, said to its listeners, "the hysterical parrots of Radio Swan have recently raised their voices scandalously." On the day following these declarations by Radio Mambi, President Osvaldo Dorticos declared in a speech over another radio station, "Cubans must be alert for lies and attempts to destroy the revolution through psychological warfare." A Cuban newspaper, at the same time, repeated Dorticos' statement: "Our enemies are intensifying psychological warfare to find weak points in our domestic front."

8. During the military action in Cuba, Radio Swan was used in tactical support of the strike force [intentional blank] Radio Swan was monitored by hemisphere radio stations and by world news services, and was an important factor in presenting the desired picture of the fighting in Cuba to world opinion. Despite some press allegations, Radio Swan was not responsible for the wild rumors during those hectic days. [intentional blank]

9. When it became obvious that the main attack on Cuba had been unsuccessful, Radio Swan deliberately anticipated Castro's victory [illegible] by admitting that the Cuban Expeditionary Force had been stopped by Communist armament, but that many of the Freedom fighters had been able to join resistence groups in the hills. Radio Swan then returned to a calm presentation of world news and over a period of one week changed from round-the-clock broadcasting to a normal schedule, avoiding all program content designed to incite the Cuban people. The producer of the consolidated program was instructed to present programs with a minimum of [illegible] content, but to continue the anti-Castro orientation through the selection of news items. At the present time present time, Radio Swan is broadcasting simultaneously over medium and short wave daily from 0500 to 0600, from 1230 to 1400, and from 1800 to 0015 (E.S.T.).  The broadcasts are made up of hourly news, [intentional blank] and other commercial programs including the relay of [intentional blank]  Neither during nor after the strike phase has there been any [illegible] of Radio Swan from any country other than Cuba and the United States.

Radio Swan began broadcasting on May 17 of 1960 on two frequencies: 50kW at 1160kHz mediumwave, and 7.5kW at 6000kHz shortwave. At first program slots were sold to various groups, who proceeded to argue and talk about issues that interested them more than they interested actual Cubans.

A year later, in March of 1961 and before the Bay of Pigs, the station stopped accepting tapes from those groups and instead began to broadcast just news, increasing its power and the quantity of frequencies on which it broadcast. Secret messages were broadcast during the invasion.

After the Bay of Pigs, Radio Swan changed its name to Radio Americas. It continued to broadcast news with an anti-Castro tilt at various times during the day until May of 1968, when it shut down.

Annihilation of the armed bands
thwarted Eisenhower’s plans

THE initial phase of the presentation of evidence related to U.S. aggression against Cuba carried out by counterrevolutionary groups in the 1960s concluded on July 8, after more than 80 witnesses testified.

The central proof concerning the origin of the military means used by these bands lies in the fact that a large percentage of them (150,000 pounds of arms, munitions and equipped flown in) fell into the hands of the revolutionary government.

Those facts were ratified by those whom the court referred to as "capital witnesses," including Generals Raúl Menéndez Tomassevich and Orlando Lorenzo Castro, Retired Colonel Víctor Dréke and other high-ranking military officers involved in the fight against bandits.

As a result of the capture and annihilation of close to 1000 bandits in the Escambray from January through March 1961, U.S. President Eisenhower’s planned mercenary invasion of Cuba, via Casilda in Trinidad, was thwarted, as Retired Division General Raúl Enrique Menéndez Tomassevich told the court.

The witness, who directed the fight against bandits at the national level from 1961 to 1963, explained that Fidel’s strategy obliged the invading mercenaries to transfer the airborne landing to Ciénaga de Zapata and guaranteed that the rearguard would remain free of enemy forces.

They were no longer able to depend on counterrevolutionary support for the action and the virtually organized beachhead collapsed underneath them. "One month later," he recalled, "the Bay of Pigs invasion was wiped out in less than 72 hours."

Nevertheless, at that stage (1961-63), the armed bands led by Julio Emilio Carretero, Tomás San Gil and Eduardo Ramírez committed a total of 71 murders to which he was witness, "first, because of the information I received and second, through the large number of interrogations of captured bandits that I carried out.

"For that reason," he affirmed, "I am absolutely sure that these bands were encouraged, directed and armed by the U.S. government. In terms of arms alone, they received these by air, land and sea."

"From 1961 to 1965, when I was appointed chief of the Central Army’s General Staff," Tomassevich continued, "there were 299 armed bands operating and they murdered 549 persons, including combatants and the civilian population. A further 200 persons were maimed."

In 1965, the CIA gave up establishing armed centers of concentration on the island and in 1966, with the help of Cuban counterrevolutionaries resident in the United States, began to organize small groups.

Tomassevich illustrated, among various landings, the one effected via Monte Barreto—an area of Miramar now occupied by the Neptuno and Tritón hotels—where two mercenaries directed by Tony Cuesta made an attempt on the life of President Fidel Castro. Tony Cuesta was captured and served a prison term.

Brigadier General Orlando Lorenzo Castro, who headed the Escambray A Special Region, after the death in combat of its first chief, Manuel (Piti) Fajardo, revealed how large quantities of arms and munitions were dropped by parachute from U.S. aircraft.

"They were dropped at various points of the Escambray," he explained, "some of which we came to control. The first of the consignments we intercepted was dropped in Salto de Hanabanilla. The crates that arrived in this manner clearly stated ‘Made in USA’."

Lorenzo Castro’s allegations also uncovered fresh evidence related to the murder of literacy teachers Conrado Benítez and Manuel Ascunce Domenech, and campesinos Helidoro Rodríguez and Pedro Lantigua.

"I’d seen Conrado a few days earlier, he was a child. After torturing him, they killed him. When I heard about it, I immediately sent detachments to the area where they killed him, which was precisely in an impenetrable location called La Tinajita. Within a few days, a number of bandits were captured and told us how they had perpetrated the crime."

In the case of literacy teacher Manuel Ascunce, "whom I loved like a son," Lorenzo stated that just before his death, he’d given him a lift in his jeep, as he often did.

"When we reached the place, Pedro Lantigua and he were still strung up and it wasn’t easy to get them down. They had been knifed to death."

He also stated that in a location known as Los Portillos, an armed band machine gunned and slaughtered an entire family, both parents and children; and another one, that of Fidel Claro and his wife, experienced a similar fate, with the exception of one of their sons who managed to escape.

Fidel Claro’s son, of the same name, never became what he most wanted to be: a pilot. And he has motive enough to blame U.S. imperialism for that. At 15 years of age, he was told in school that his father and stepmother had been murdered.

When he arrived, "The entire house had been machine-gunned," he recounted. "They were attacked while they were asleep. My stepmother, who was five months pregnant, was found with her belly shot to pieces. My nine-year-old brother remained traumatized for life. Although miraculously he wasn’t killed, the psychological wounds inflicted had an irreversible effect on him.

"After the funeral, my brother and I were left with no alternative. Fernando never went back to the artillery school. Both of us joined the struggle. I gave up my spot in the Mariel School of Aviation. I no longer had it in me to study. I never got to be a pilot," this witness recalled. He concluded his evidence by saying that he and his family "recognize the U.S. government as responsible for the victims, because they armed and financed the bands."

Witness Emilio Hernández, who had responsibilities in the central region, presented more details concerning the crime against the Claro family: "After killing the pregnant woman, they pulled out the fetus and tore it apart. We counted around 400 bullet holes in the house."

Marcelo Martínez was head of the 63rd battalion in the fight against bandits. He recounted that, on one occasion in 1961, on a farm near Cabaiguán, a plane dropped approximately 30 packets containing grenades, mortars, foodstuffs, communications equipment, pistols and holsters, "some of which we recovered, and for that reason I can affirm that they were of U.S. origin."

Other witnesses denounced the murder of their brothers, like Antolín Valenzuela and Rafael Pisco; of their children, like Julio García, Cresencia Contreras and Manuela Santana; of their husbands, like Consuelo Téllez, who was left with two small children; or of their fathers, like Elsida Padrón, who was only six when he saw her father killed and her home and school burned down.

The court also heard and accepted visual evidence of injuries suffered by Hedelto Sotologo, Lorenzo Martínez and Manuel Bombano, among others.

All the propaganda and basic messages reaching the counterrevolutionary groups were received via Radio Swan, stated Aníbal Veláz, at that time head of State Security in Las Villas province.

"Radio Swan is a CIA station, that is totally proven," he added.

Alberto Delgado Delgado, a member of the Cuban security force, was an alleged enemy agent in Operation Transfer. "This plan allowed us (substituting for the CIA) to make the bandits believe that we were going to get them out of the country," the witness testified. "Once in the hands of the revolutionary troops, they were taken prisoner." In that way they succeeded in capturing many of the main band leaders, such as Maro Borges and Emilio Carretero who, as a result of the revolutionary offensive, were fleeing and seeking a way to leave the country.

Veláz testified how, during that operation, the infamous bandit Cheito León, Alberto Delgado’s killer, told Carretero (supposedly out of the country) to send him a message via Swan Radio as a guarantee that he really was in the United States. This is irrevocable proof that Radio Swan, operating from U.S. territory, was at the counterrevolutionaries’ disposition.

CIA STRATEGY DATING BACK TO BEFORE 1959

Prior to 1959, the CIA penetrated the forces that would afterwards turn against the Revolution. The U.S. intelligence services began to train the so-called Escambray Second National Front, headed by Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, once the victory of the Sierra Maestra rebels was imminent.

This fact was confirmed in the statement given by Víctor Dréke Cruz, who had various responsibilities in the fight against bandits in the early 1960s and subsequently during the Bay of Pigs mercenary invasion.

According to Dréke, the CIA strategy was to penetrate the Escambray area via the bands which constituted its armed wing. William Morgan, a U.S. citizen who belonged to the Second Front but joined the revolutionaries in 1959, and who was supposedly involved in combating those armed bands utilized by the U.S. government, took advantage of his position in the ranks of the militia to organize the counterrevolutionary groups.

Dréke relates that the bands’ initial actions were directed at the theft of arms from garrisons in the areas, aided by other persons who didn’t support the Revolution or who were confused. After the siege of the Escambray mounted by the militia, U.S. imperialism changed its tactics and directed the armed bands to split into smaller groups. Combating them became more difficult.

They began to intimidate campesinos and townspeople through kidnap, rape and murder. Terror was unleashed.

From that time on, sectors and subsectors of the militia were formed to operate from various points, and the revolutionary struggle likewise changed its tactics.

The witness told the court that thanks to unified action between the state security combatants and the militia, the fight could be concluded.

Víctor Dréke’s evidence was followed by the testimony of Gaspar Delgado. His father Iginio was shot dead by Francisco Navarro’s band on June 22, 1963, and his body machine-gunned in the northern area of Yaguajay.