Fact: The domino theory was accurate. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand stayed free of Communism because of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam. The Indonesians threw the Soviets out in 1966 because of America's commitment in Vietnam. Without that commitment, Communism would have swept all the way to the Malacca Straits that is south of Singapore and of great strategic importance to the free world. If you ask people who live in these countries who won the war in Vietnam, they have a different opinion from the American news media. The Vietnam War was the turning point for Communism.

Myth: The United States lost the war in Vietnam.

Fact: The American military was not defeated in Vietnam. The American military did not lose a battle of any consequence. From a military standpoint, it was almost an unprecedented performance. General Westmoreland quoting Douglas Pike, a professor at the University of California Berkley, "A major military defeat for the VC and NVA."

Fact: THE UNITED STATES DID NOT LOSE THE WAR IN VIETNAM, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE DID. The fall of Saigon happened 30 April 1975, two years AFTER the American military left Vietnam. The last American troops departed in their entirety 29 March 1973.

Fact: How could we lose a war we had already stopped fighting? We fought to an agreed stalemate. The peace settlement was signed in Paris on 27 January 1973.

* It called for release of all U.S. prisoners, withdrawal of U.S. forces, limitation of both sides forces inside South Vietnam and a commitment to peaceful reunification.

* The 140,000 evacuees in April 1975 during the fall of Saigon consisted almost entirely of civilians and Vietnamese military, NOT American military running for their lives.

* There were almost twice as many casualties in Southeast Asia (primarily Cambodia) the first two years after the fall of Saigon in 1975 then there were during the ten years the U.S. was involved in Vietnam.

* Thanks for the perceived loss and the countless assassinations and torture visited upon Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians goes mainly to the American media and their undying support-by-misrepresentation of the anti-War movement in the United States.

* As with much of the Vietnam War, the news media misreported and misinterpreted the 1968 Tet Offensive. It was reported as an overwhelming success for the Communist forces and a decided defeat for the U.S. Forces. Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite initial victories by the Communists forces, the Tet Offensive resulted in a major defeat of those forces. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the designer of the Tet Offensive, is considered by some as ranking with Wellington, Grant, Lee and MacArthur as a great commander. Still, militarily, the Tet Offensive was a total defeat of the Communist forces on all fronts. It resulted in the death of some 45,000 NVA troops and the complete, if not total destruction of the Viet Cong elements in South Vietnam. The Organization of the Viet Cong Units in the South never recovered. The Tet Offensive succeeded on only one front and that was the News front and the political arena. This was another example in the Vietnam War of an inaccuracy becoming the perceived truth. However, inaccurately reported, the News Media made the Tet Offensive famous.

All credit for the research of these myths belongs to:

Capt. Marshal Hanson, U.S.N.R (Ret.)

Capt. Scott Beaton, Statistical Source

Since 9/11 we have been at war with Islamic terrorists. The global scope of this war makes it the Third World War. Lincoln, paraphrasing a statement in the New Testament, said: ("A house divided against itself cannot stand"). We seem to be as divided today over Iraq and Afghanistan as we were during the Vietnam war. The news media has misreported and misinterpreted our war efforts in the past. Do not be deceived again. Whether or not you agree with United States policy; if we lose this war we will cease to exist as a nation. Remember Gen. William Westmoreland's statement about the falling of the dominoes and let us not make the same mistake again we made with Viet Nam.

The 377th Combat Support Group was responsible for protecting Tan Son Nhut Air Base and they are the reason why I'm still alive today. My friend Charles Penely, who was a member of the 377th SPS, has an excellent web page devoted to the 377th and would welcome your interest. Please feel free to follow the links below:

During the month of May Tan Son Nhut Air Base was subjected to enemy standoff attacks by Mortars, 122mm rockets, automatic/small arms and probing actions on the south perimeter. The attempted ground penetration on the south perimeter was between Delta Bunker #7 and Delta Bunker #6. From 0616 hours, 6 May 1968 through 0700 hours, 22 May 1968 each of these attacks either preceded or was in conjunction with enemy infiltration attempts and ground assault activities against the air base and adjoining areas.

* The major attack and most significant threat came from the west, it was conducted by elements of the 271 and 272 VC Regiment. Their mission was to enter and hold the 6th precinct along with the Phu Tho Hoa area. Elements of the 272 Regiment attempted to attack TSN by infiltrating from the French Cemetery with an alternate mission to attack CMD Hq's. The total enemy KIA in the area of the Phu Tho Race Track to the French Cemetery adjacent to TSN was 588.

* At 0616 hours, 6 May 1968, one of the air base perimeter observation towers (Tango I an 142' tower) reported incoming rockets (Ten Rockets hit Tan Son Nhut. There were no causalities). Two minutes later Tango I reported heavy movement behind the Catholic school, adjacent to the south perimeter. At this time all reserve QRT's were dispatched to their pre-designated deployment locations.

* At 0620 hours, two units of task force 35 (Army II and III) were notified and deployed within Delta sector, which at the time was receiving sporadic small arms and automatic weapons fire. Tango I reported razorbacks making heavy contact with an unknown size enemy unit behind the Catholic School.

* At 0722 hours, Delta Bunkers 7 and 8 (two of the outer perimeter bunkers) reported approximately 40 individuals in black clothing moving outside the south perimeter heading in an easterly direction.

* At 0726 hours, Delta Bunker 6 reported it had made heavy contact with approximately 40 Viet Cong in the French Cemetery adjacent to his post. At this point a tank accompanied by a platoon of ground troops from the 33rd VNAF Wing, Defense Group arrived at the French Cemetery and engaged the enemy.

* At 0739 hours, two companies of RVN Airborne instituted a sweep of the southwest perimeter of the base. They encountered heavy fire from various Viet Cong positions within the buildings in that area. The Viet Cong heavily employed RG-P-2 rockets and automatic weapons on the assaulting airborne company.

* At 0900 hours, the commanding officer of the RVN Airborne companies in the southwest perimeter area, requested the assistance of the heavy weapons utilized by the Security Police.

* At 0913 hours, BG-5 (.50 Cal. Machine Gun) and B-9-3 (90mm recoilless rifle) engaged the Viet Cong in the village adjacent to the south perimeter. B-9-3 fired 3 rounds of 90mm destroying enemy RPG-2 rocket firing positions which were blocking the Vietnamese Airborne companies sweep of the area. BG-5, destroyed an enemy machine gun position which was protecting the before mentioned RPG-2 site. At this time BG-5 and B-9-3 disengaged the enemy and returned to Delta Sector. The ARVN Airborne had taken the full impact and were routing the enemy.

* At 1205 hours, our liaison NCO deployed with Army II of Task Force 35 and reported that 60mm mortars were hitting his defensive positions adjacent to Tango 21 along our southern perimeter. 20 friendly personnel were WIA as a result of this mortar barrage. Delta Sector supervisor (T/Sgt. McNitt) reported observing an individual on a roof top adjacent to Delta Sector holding an aiming stick. Permission to fire was granted and the individual was eliminated. Subsequent to this action, the mortar barrage ceased. From this point continuous sniper fire was directed towards the south perimeter, while the RVN Airborne were clearing this area.

At 0303/0406 hours, 7 May 1968, Tango 4 reported rockets were impacting on the base. A total of eleven rounds were verified as having impacted on the base, causing minor damage to one (1) C-130, runway 25L and the PSP ramp. The impact pattern indicated that the flight line was the probable target during this attack.

At 0300, 8 May 1968, a total of 14 122mm rockets impacted on the base inflicting moderate damage to a recently completed building, minor damage to a generator in the MARS complex and minor damage to the pavement in the heliport. The general pattern indicated that the housing and general work areas were the primary targets of this attack Damage was moderate to minor.

At 0325, 10 May 1968, seven rounds of 122mm rockets impacted on the base resulting in negligible damage. The pattern of the attack appeared to be harassment.

Throughout these attacks, enemy probes and sniper fire were continuous. The reason for such action by the enemy was probably best explained by the following comments in the Combat Operations Report.

Lessons Learned:

The concept that Tan Son Nhut Air Base can be penetrated only by small sapper units and that the enemy has the capability to launch only small scale operations in the Tan Son Nhut vicinity became obsolete with the 31 January 1968 attack and the TET Offensive, and a new type of enemy threat was encountered. A major re-evaluation of present base defense procedures and principles has become an immediate necessity.

a. Security Police personnel and augmentees (TF-35) were well-supervised and well-trained in fire control and discipline and in basic tactics, but were neither equipped nor trained well enough to effectively counter a regiment-size enemy assault. Consideration should be given to Base Security Police receiving more infantry type training prior to assignment in Southeast Asia. Emphasis should be placed on crew served and heavy weapons, assault tactics, and deployment procedures. Existing Air Force training in Southeast Asia is not sufficient to enable Security Police forces to effectively counter forces of this size, equipped as they were.

b. Current concepts of base defense and protection of USAF resources as established by higher headquarter's directives should be reviewed. In our opinion too much emphasis is placed on the close in protection of resources. With the weapons available to the enemy, close in guards are useless. Security forces must be moved from the revetments and other restricted areas to the perimeter, where they can effectively engage the enemy. Further, we must have the capability to respond with properly equipped reaction forces. In conjunction with this, the existing defense alignment of the installation must be re-evaluated and changed in light of the new enemy tactics encountered.

c. Reaction forces were able to respond quickly and halt the enemy advance. This was primarily due to the base defense posture at the time of the attack. Had the Security condition been anything other than RED (Option I) or YELLOW, reaction forces would have had to contain the enemy further inside the interior of the base, probably at much greater loss in lives and USAF resources. It is recommended that a larger standby reaction force be utilized in place of the 12 man Reserve Security Alert Team (RSAT). A fifty man reaction force properly equipped with the same immediate response capability as RSAT would more realistically enable Security Police personnel to halt the enemy at an acceptable distance from priority resources.

d. A free fire zone/clear area must be established around the perimeter of the base. If free fire zones/clear areas had been established the enemy would not have had easy access to the perimeter fence and much of the small arms activity would not have taken place. These zones would also have prevented the enemy from setting up crew served weapon positions and ammunition supply areas adjacent to the base perimeter. Recommend that the free fire zone be extended at least 1,000 meters around the perimeter.

e. Medical personnel should be more readily available to the Security Police. Their training, manning and employment should be such that they would be capable of immediate support to the base defense operation. Entry of medical personnel into the affected area and subsequent evacuation of wounded became an acute problem during the battle. If medical personnel are to continue to be employed in this theater of operation, independent of base defense forces, they must establish and maintain a close liaison with the Security Police to insure that they are fully aware of the positioning of all defensive units and routes of entry into all areas. In addition, medical personnel must receive sufficient combat training to enable them to effectively perform under hostile fire.

f. A more stringent control of weapons issue to non-defensive force personnel is immediately required. Many of these personnel hampered the Security Police effort and on some occasions were nearly mistaken for hostile forces. Personnel should be instructed to take cover, and weapons should not be issued until Security Condition RED (Option II) is declared.

g. It has been determined from battlefield reports that at the point of penetration some personnel of the 2nd Services Battalion (ARVN) deserted their static defense posts. Reasons for the desertion have not been established, but an investigation is being conducted by the Vietnamese authorities. From these reports, it is apparent that there is need for closer coordination between Vietnamese and U.S. Forces involved in the combined defense of an installation. All indications point to an absolute need for the co-manning of defensive positions throughout the perimeter.

h. Local intelligence data available to the base defense forces was entirely void of information pertinent to enemy plans and movements in the immediate area. Defense force personnel must assume that future intelligence reports have questionable validity. They must maintain a posture that will render them totally prepared for an attack at any time, regardless of intelligence indicators.

i. The most significant lesson learned from the attack, and the one which requires the most immediate attention, is the need for more and better equipment. Heavier weapons are urgently needed to effectively combat penetrating forces.

(1) XM-148 Grenade launchers proved to be difficult to operate under combat conditions. Their use is extremely limited during the hours of darkness as their design requires a special sighting device which is useless during darkness. Recommend we consider bringing M-79 Grenade Launchers back into the Air Force inventory, and its wide variety of ordnance (HE, illumination, canister, white phosphorous, etc.) be obtained for maximum utilization. As an alternate solution, recommend the sighting mechanism of the XM-148 be corrected immediately to allow for effective night time employment.

(2) Mortars should be considered for direct support illumination and for direct HE fire against attacking ground forces and enemy support fire positions.

(3) Recoilless rifles would have been of great assistance in destroying positions adjacent the West perimeter and inside the 051 Bunker. The counter attack would have been started much earlier and completed at less cost to friendly forces if reaction forces had been able to suppress and destroy enemy crew-served positions.

(4) Some type of rocket launcher is a must. The Amy has in its inventory a light anti-tank weapon (LAW) which is considered ideal for destroying reinforced enemy positions. The LAW could be carried as part of a Security Alert Team's equipment. The weapon is easily operated and the launcher is disposable after use. Its incorporation into the Security Police inventory would be an immediate and noteworthy improvement.

(5) In conjunction with the need for heavier weapons and increased fire power, the safe transportation of this equipment and personnel is a must. Armored personnel carriers (APCs) are considered the most appropriate vehicle for this transportation. These vehicles can be utilized for transportation to the affected area, heavy weapons support fire, and evacuation of injured. Although neither this nor any other vehicle will provide total-safety for the personnel, it will provide protection from small arms and small caliber automatic weapons fire.

(6) It was evident during the attack that the present communications system employed by Security Police personnel was completely unsatisfactory. There is a strong need for more powerful portable units, able to receive all units involved in the defense operation. This would alleviate the problem of units cutting each other out because they did not receive other units transmitting. Power sources which can sustain operational requirements over an extended period of time are necessary for these radio units. Had the installation been subjected to more than one penetration, multi-channel (more than two) radios would have been required to successfully contain and destroy the attacking forces.

(7) Direct communications with supporting units (LFTs, AC-47s, Flare Ships, etc.) is an immediate requirement. This capability is essential for effective direct control of supporting units on the scene by in-place Security Police supervisory personnel. During the initial phases of the battle, requests for and direction of specific support fire had to be relayed from on-scene positions through Security Police radio channels to JDOC, which relayed the requests and directions to the supporting units. The resulting time lag made the supporting fire less effective than it would have been if direct communications had been available.

j. The above lessons learned of course apply to operations in SEA. We do not intend to imply that these recommendations would apply Air Force wide.

I have had personal experience with *, d., f., and g. above. Read about my experiences on May 6th, 1968 in Attack on TSN and in Keith W. Nolans last book "House to House; Playing the Enemy's Game in Saigon, May 1968".

Related Comments

Charley Flight was the Security Shift that worked from 7 PM to 7 AM and Delta Sector was that section of the perimeter, along the perimeter road, that started south of a line from the Main Gate to just past the BX. The bunker that first detected a sizable force was an old French bunker that bordered the Cholon Road with its back to our bunker line. That bunker was not manned by us before TET but it was after TET. A1C McCormick was on the bunker that was the first to report VC movement. He later told us they passed within feet of him and never engaged him. Our shift was waiting for shift change at that time. As during TET, relief never came. I was the A gunner, meaning back up to the M-60, and ammo bearer that shift. The Security Sector Supervisor was T/Sgt. McNitt. The M-60 gunner was Sgt. Holcomb and I. The VC, once past the Cholon Bunker, infiltrated the housing area that extended to the Main Gate. We engaged them, almost never actually seeing them, just responding to fire received from various huts. During the fire fight my M-16 malfunctioned. I could only get 2 rounds off and would have to charge the weapon again. Approximately 10 min into the fire fight a Security SAT team responded. SAT was a roving patrol that responded to back up effected areas. One of the SAT members ( Sgt. Frank Bracken ) gave me his weapon. They were M-60 equipped and also carried LAWS. As the fire fight moved towards the 1200 area we started to receive mortar rounds, very heavy in the mail room area, and Sgt. Holcomb was hit by fragmentation in the face. I spotted a person on a rooftop and it looked like he was spotting for the incoming mortar rounds. T/Sgt. McNitt called Security Control and confirmed that the rooftop position was not ARVN. T/Sgt. McNitt then told me to fire on him. I fired twice, hitting him both times, and the mortars stopped. I received a Bronze Star about a year later at Reese AFB TX. I don't know if anyone else did. The Security Police Force that responded to the 1200 area were a Safe Side Unit. That was a unit of SP's that were mobile, to respond to any Air Base in Viet Nam under siege, augmenting the primary force. Those of us that were involved in that action that day received an Honorary CIB (Combat Infantryman's Badge) from the Army. The 377th SPS is the only Security Force from Viet Nam still on active duty and the most decorated in Air Force History. The first in country and the last to leave. Until TET that section of the perimeter was manned by SP's. Only after TET did they encumber us with ARVN. One ARVN had his family living in his bunker. On numerous occasions jeeps would stop and stay for 5 or 10 minutes, depending on virility, and then leave. I was later told by one source that the rooftop spotter was ARVN. I don't know and I don't care. After I fired on him the mortars stopped and no one else was hurt.

A1C Renny Della Porta 377 SPS

If you would like to read about the efforts of the 377th SPS in defense of Tan Son Nhut Air Base during TET and Mini TET, I can highly recommend the books THE BATTLE FOR SAIGON; TET 1968 and House to House; Playing the Enemy's Game in Saigon, May 1968 by Keith William Nolan.